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III

The Encoding Grammar and Semantics

3.1. Semantics in Language and Semantics in Linguistics

In the two previous chapters I have used the term *semantics* as if it were self-explanatory. Nevertheless, for the purpose of discussing in more detail how it is supposed to work within the Encoding Grammar it is necessary to examine the notion of *semantics* itself. Some of the remarks presented in this section are fairly trivial, but need to be made to avoid misunderstandings later on.

Beyond doubt, in its generally accepted usage, the term may apply to a linguistic discipline or to some property of the object of linguistics, i.e. the language itself. Moreover, it can refer to the property of language as a general phenomenon or to some features of a particular language or group of languages. The two aspects are not independent, just the contrary, they are intrinsically interwoven, since *semantics* as a linguistic theory and as a linguistic discipline is concerned first and foremost with determining what property of language it is supposed to capture and describe, or more precisely, at what level it is supposed to capture the fact that linguistic utterances have meaning.

One of the distinctions that can be used to illustrate that the question 'what property and at what level' is valid, is the contrast that Fillmore [1985: 230-232] makes between what he calls the truth semantics or T-semantics and the semantics of Understanding (U-semantics). The semantics of understanding, as the name shows, is concerned with the meanings that the audience would understand from a particular utterance. He illustrates it with the sentence

(3.1) *My dad wasted most of the morning on the bus.* [Fillmore 1985: 230]

In his analysis the information that the bus was in motion along its regular route and the presence or the father's presence on board was irrelevant for that route being taken (understood from the phrase *on the bus*, as opposed to *in the bus*) is not a part of T-semantics of the sentence in question. Neither is the information that "the Speaker's father's time could be better employed elsewhere" (understood from *wasted*). He also states that *morning* being

understood as 'from 8 AM to 12 AM' and not 'from 0 to 12 AM' is not a matter of truth semantics. Other information conveyed by this sentence and not included in its T-semantic description involve the age of the speaker and the relation between the speaker and the addressee (a young person is talking to somebody who is not a member of the same household that the speaker).

Another type of distinction concerns the distinction between linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of meaning. A telling example can be found, among others, in Iordanskaya, Mel'čuk [2009: 1[1]]. The authors claim that the English expression *half past four* and the Russian expression *polovina pjatogo* 'lit. half five' have different meanings, or to use their own words "[…] English and Russian use different meanings in order to name the same moment." [Iordanskaya, Mel'čuk 2009: 2], although the two meanings are considered "(quasi)equivalent" and correspond to '16:30'. However, within the model the authors follow, i.e. the Meaning⇔Text Model, the notion of '16:30' is not the *meaning* of neither *half past four* nor *polovina pjatogo* but corresponds to *conceptual system*, which is common to both languages. For the authors the notion of the semantic structure that represents meaning is strongly language specific (cf. 2.3. *The Encoding Grammar And The Meaning⇔Text Model*). Thus the authors capture the meaning at a relatively "shallow", i.e. "close-to-the-surface" level. Interestingly, they draw parallel between their notion of meaning and that of Russell and say: "(Cf. B. Russell's famous example of the two different meanings corresponding to the same referent: 'Sir Walter Scott' and 'the author of *Waverley'*.)"

Since the idea of having language-specific meaning is crucial for the MTM model, the claim that the meanings of *half past four* and *polovina pjatogo* are different, albeit equivalent is valid within the model, but will not be so, if meaning is understood in a less theory-specific way. Outside the MTM models if two meanings are equivalent they are the same meaning. Moreover, outside the MTM model it is possible to speak about equivalent meanings only if one adopts the decoding perspective. Thus for the Encoding Grammar in both the English and the Russian phrases the meaning is the same. Within the Encoding Grammar it is also possible to argue that the difference between *half past four* and *polovina pjatogo* is not the same as the difference between *sir Walter Scott* and *the author of Waverley*.[2] In the latter case, alternating the two descriptions in encoding, if the encoding perspective is adopted, or understanding that they refer to the same person, if the decoding perspective is adopted, is a matter of possessing the extralinguistic knowledge that sir Walter Scott wrote *Waverley*. (Since the identity of the referent is extralinguistic, at purely decoding level *sir Walter Scott* is decoded as a proper name and *the author of Waverley* as a 'the creator or a piece of work, called *Waverley*'). By contrast, people who have learned to tell the time, i.e. to read the face of their watches, when learning Russian as foreign language simply learn that the proper way to encode the half-hours is in reference to the next full hour, while those learning English as a foreign language learn that the proper way to do it is with reference to the last hour, unless they want to sound like high officials of British Navy (cf. 1630hours). The only difference is that while in English the encoding is easy, because the fact that the previous hour (and not the next hour) is mentioned is also explicitly encoded (by *past*), in Russian the relation between the 'half hour' and the 'full hour' is not encoded lexically. Nevertheless, neither learners of Russian as a foreign language nor learners of English as foreign language need to re-learn reading the clock in order to learn to tell time in either language, thus no extralinguistic knowledge is involved. Incidentally, the difference between the two types of equivalence

[1] Page numbers according to the electronic version.
[2] Both are taken here as emblematic for some more general issues.

invoked here give a rule of the thumb distinction between decoding and understanding: understanding may involve extralinguistic knowledge, while decoding never does.

Interestingly, it seems that the MTM model in its treatment of meaning as a part of language opposed to non-linguistic information is very close to Hjelmslevian distinction between the form and the substance of the plane of contents: very roughly speaking, MTM includes in meaning what for Hjelmslev would be plerematics (i.e. the form of the plane of contents, which would involve the signifieds of signs of a particular language, i.e. Mel'čuk's semantemes), while Hjelmslevian semantics (i.e. the substance of the plane of contents, the *meritum*, i.e. human thought) would fall beyond the scope of the Meaning⇔Text model of language.

Both the MTM and the Frame Semantics mentioned here strongly link semantics with lexical units (although in the MTM terminology, the distinction between *meaning* and *sense* is important: *meaning* is related to texts, i.e. sentences and utterances, while *sense* is the property of words). They differ, among other things, as to how they model language (bidirectionality of MTM vs. unidirectionality of the Frame Semantics) and whether they include extralinguistic phenomena (MTM does not, while the Frame Semantic does, with a vengeance). The two approaches to language discussed in this section also serve to illustrate how the way the meaning is apprehended in a model is directly related to the way it is described.

3.2. The Universality and Compositionality of Semantics

The way meaning is presented within a particular model may be also linked to the stand the model's authors take on the universality of semantics. The notion of universality, in principle an absolute one, can be nevertheless seen as a relative or gradual one, or in other terms, it is possible to understand the universality of semantics in broader or in narrower sense. In the broadest possible sense the tenet of universality is trivial: having meaning is a definitional feature of language. In a less general sense, one can talk about cross-linguistic universality of semantics, in a sense that all meanings are conveyable in all languages. Obviously, since lexical units of one language tend to have no direct equivalents in another, this means that to achieve cross-linguistic universality of meaning a model has to be able to present it fairly independently of the lexicon of a particular language. This is what structural componential semantic has been all about. However, the compositionality of semantics and of meaning can again be understood as a feature of the language itself, or as a feature of the model adopted. In the latter case the meaning is decomposed into abstract, aprioristic primitive terms postulated *a priori*. This is the approach proposed in classic works by Katz and Fodor [Katz, Fodor 1963] and by Manfred Bierwisch [1967; 1970]; Bierwisch's [1967] proposal has been further developed by Ewald Lang [1989; 1991; 1995]. The other approach is to say that the elements into which meanings can be decomposed are present in every natural language, as has been done by Anna Wierzbicka and is continued within the Natural Semantic Metalanguage Project. As Wierzbicka [1996: 22-23] writes:

> But if we can identify the shared core of all natural languages and build on this basis a "natural semantic metalanguage" we can then describe the meanings conveyed in any language, as if from inside, while at the same time using sentences from our own language, which—if a times unidiomatic—are none the less directly intelligible to us. To put it differently, the shared core of all languages can be seen as a set of isomorphic mini-languages, which can be used as language-specific versions of the same, universal Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM)

The quote deals with describing meanings conveyed in a language thus positions the NMS within the decoding perspective. Other statements of the author and about the author show, nevertheless, that semantic primes postulated by Wierzbicka have to be available to speakers of all languages for encoding as well. For example on the NSM Homepage[3] one can read:

> Finally, a few more words about the conceptual status of semantic primes. In Anna Wierzbicka's writings the terms 'semantic' and 'conceptual' are used more or less interchangeably, the idea being that semantic primes represent elements of linguistic conceptualisation, i.e. elements out of which complex linguistic concepts are built.

Moreover, in numerous instances Wierzbicka seems to say that the apparent absence of the respective linguistic unit with one-two-one correspondence to a semantic prime is not a counterargument against postulating universal character of the prime. Among other instances she mentions [Wierzbicka 1996: 79-80] that the Tariana language has a single verb corresponding to the primes SEE and HEAR, nevertheless the word is polysemous, the evidence for polysemy being the fact that in the 'hear' sense the verb requires an appropriate object. Similar evidence against apparent absence of some primes in languages is given through the entire chapter [Wierzbicka 1996: 35-112].

Moreover, she states that the fact that a linguistic community often does not use words corresponding to some primes is not evidence for their not having this prime within the conceptual system, moreover, they will find a way to encode it, if pressed [Wierzbicka 1996: 184-210].

This ability to convey a concept or a meaning within any natural language is also a major premise of the Encoding Grammar as far as semantics is concerned. It is assumed that semantics is, broadly speaking, cross-linguistically universal. This means that all and every thought can be conveyed, i.e. encoded in any language. On the other hand, in some languages some meanings are easier to convey because there are ready-made ways to encode them available. The semantics postulated for the Encoding Grammar, both for the semantic structure and the semantic representation is compositional in nature—both the meaning to be encoded, i.e. the semantic representation, and the signifieds of lexical units, together with other means of encoding, i.e. the semantic structure, would ideally be presented in terms of semantic components linked together (in the two previous chapters they were referred to as *configurations*). In the ideal world of linguistics the Encoding Grammar would be able to show the appropriate meanings as composed of nothing but further unanalyzed, elementary semantic components, i.e. some kind of semantic primes or semes, maybe even just those proposed within the NSM project. An important feature of the semantic composition proposed for the signifieds is that it has to be exhaustive: the components and their relations must be equivalent to the meaning of the lexical unit. Only then the match between the appropriate signified and a configuration of meaning to be encoded can be made.

3.3. The Semantic Representation

The Semantic Representation is actually but a construct necessary to present what the Encoding Grammar is supposed to encode. It should contain the appropriate elementary senses and specify relations between them. Some elementary senses are predicate-like, and thus correspond to Bierwisch [1970: 172ff] relational components, while others are argument-

[3] http://www.une.edu.au/bcss/linguistics/nsm/semantics-in-brief.php. (2011.12.09)

like. Among predicate-like components the Encoding Grammar postulates those corresponding roughly to MTM semantic roles of participants.

Similarly to what is proposed by [Mel'čuk 2004a: 12], some of the participants may not be encoded by a separate linguistic unit. The semantic representation that would eventually give rise to a sentence about somebody lying somewhere would contain a component corresponding to the fact that there is some surface supporting this person; this would obviously be encoded through the choice of the lexical unit meaning 'to lie'. By contrast, a semantic representation containing a component corresponding to the fact that the person is supported by a medium would be encoded with the use of a lexical unit meaning 'to float', or a similar one. If no support is specified in the semantic representation, the lexical choice may be similar that of 'to levitate', though it could be argued that with verbs like 'to levitate' the medium, i.e. the air, is specified within the semantic representation.

It is assumed that these senses are represented in a graph-like form, similar in nature to semantic structure postulated for the MTM model. Obviously, since it is composed of much smaller chunks (elementary senses and not semantemes) it is even more difficult to visualize and no attempt to do it will be made throughout the book.

The semantic representation corresponds to the meaning of a single sentence, simple or compound. The greatest paradox of its position within Encoding Grammar is that this representation is not accessible for analysis unless it has been encoded, and successfully enough. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to state explicitly what it is supposed to contain and what it cannot contain. To illustrate this I will use some of the examples discussed previously and also will draw heavily on various sources, including some seminal works on meaning, to show how the semantic representation is supposed to differ from other accounts of meaning.

First of all, as it has already been said, the semantic representation is unambiguous, even if the corresponding sentence is. Thus the semantic representation of the famous sentence

(3.2) *John bought the Times*

either contains components that make up the meaning 'a single copy of a newspaper' or components that make up the meaning 'a company that publishes the newspaper called *The Times*'.

Similarly

(3.3) *X went to into a house yesterday and found a tortoise inside the front door.* Grice [1975: 56]

does not contain components that link 'house' and 'tortoise' with X. Even if the house and the tortoise belonged in real life to X, this is not a part of the semantic representation of this sentence. The absence of some information within the semantic representation of a sentence does not imply that this piece of information cannot be true: it is possible that both the house and the tortoise belonged to X, and the speaker wanted perversely not to convey this information to the addressee. There is no need for the semantic representation to be true in the sense of corresponding to any actual state of affairs.

The distinction between what is a part of the semantic representation of a given sentence and what is not has to be established for the particular sentence. Above (in *3.1. Semantics in Language and Semantics in Linguistics*) I have argued that the fact that the phrases *sir Walter Scott* and *the author of Waverley* refer to the same individual is

extralinguistic. Nevertheless, it can be a part of what is encoded. The obvious case is provided by the semantic representation of a straightforward sentence about identity, i.e.

(3.4) *Sir Walter Scott is the author of Waverley.*

A less obvious and somehow convoluted case could be provided if we imagined a hapless Polish schoolchild of the past century writing in their essay:

. (3.5) *Wśród powieści sir Walter Scotta najbardziej podoba mi się ta, której akcję autor „Waverleya" umieścił w Palestynie*.
'Among novels by sir Walter Scott I liked best is the one the action of which the author of "Waverley" had placed in Palestine. '

The Polish version is less clumsy than the English gloss, but clumsy nevertheless. Yet Polish school, while teaching style insisted on avoiding repetitions and using synonyms and paraphrases, and also on demonstrating a detailed (encyclopedic) knowledge of the subject. Thus the author of (3.5) might have been willing to show, obliquely, that they know that sir Walter Scott has not only written *The Talisman*, but *Waverley* as well. Naturally, the sentence would be corrected by the teacher, nevertheless, the semantic representation of (3.5) contains the fact that sir Walter Scott and the author of Waverley is the same person. This is the part of the semantic representation that triggers the pattern

(3.6) *wśród powieści X najbardziej podoba mi się ta, w której X …*
'Among novels by X, I liked most the one in which X…

as appropriate for encoding. The semantic, and not extralinguistic character of the co-reference encoded by (3.6) becomes clear if (3.5) is modified to contain a blatant factual error as a part of its meaning:

(3.7) *Wśród powieści sir Walter Scotta najbardziej podoba mi się ta, której akcję autor „Ostatniego Mohikanina" umieścił w Palestynie*.
'Among novels by sir Walter Scott I liked best is the one the action of which the author of "Last of the Mohicans" had placed in Palestine.'

Since the semantic representation postulated within Encoding Grammar is limited to a single sentence it does not contain components that the speaker may wish to convey as the next part of their discourse. Thus two subsequent utterances of the same speaker may encode different elements of meaning concerning the same element of reality. For example the speaker may utter (3.3) as a part of a narrative in which X had suffered an attack of amnesia and the narrative device they use is that of having the protagonist as the focalizator of this part of their story. In such case the narrative strategy would be not to encode the fact that it was X's own house in (3.3) and reveal it later on as a surprise to the reader.

The semantic representation is not uniquely propositional and may contain attitudes and valorizations. The use of denigratory or offensive terms in encoding is triggered by appropriate elements in semantic representation. An example is provided the Polish word *bachor*, used with reference to a child but also encoding the speaker's annoyance (in contrast

to neutral *dziecko* ‘child’). Should the same representation be encoded in English, the appropriate way would be to encode the speaker’s emotional attitude by appropriate adjective (cf. *an obnoxious child*).

The semantic representation may also contain other types of information. For example it may specify that the speaker is talking about another speech event. However, this part of the meaning may be passed over in encoding, if the semantic structure (discussed in some detail below) offers no appropriate means.

Until now I have been illustrating the contents of the semantic representation by components that eventually get encoded by parts of signifieds of some linguistic units. These are not the only component the semantic representation contains. It may contain for example the temporal relation between events, that eventually get encoded by linear sequence of elements, as in Polish asyndetic constructions with perfective verbs:

(3.8a) *Zadzwonił do żony, wrócił do domu.*
‘He called his wife, he returned home.’
(3.8b) *Wrócił do domu, zadzwonił do żony.*
‘He returned home, he called his wife.’

If a conjunction is introduced, the order of conjuncts encodes the sequence, both in English and in Polish:

(3.9a) *Zadzwonił do żony i wrócił do domu.*
He called his wife and returned home.
(3.9b) *Wrócił do domu i zadzwonił do żony.*
He returned home and called his wife.

Finally, as mentioned before, the semantic representation is divided into components of meaning that correspond to thematic and rhematic parts. This is done by marking the appropriate components in such a way that the graph that would be the visualization of the entire representation is divided into islands of themes and rhemes.

3.4. The Semantic Structure

3.4.1. Properties of Lexical Units

The semantic structure is also a construct, but to a lesser degree than the semantic representation. Moreover, as already mentioned, the semantic structure belongs to *langue* and not *parole.* In principle, on the one hand it can be reconstructed by a linguist through analyses of the use of linguistic means available to the speaker within a particular language. On the other hand, its presence is not something the speaker is normally aware of, as long as there is no mismatch between it and the semantic representation. As I have written on the nature of semantic structure [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2012]:

> Jest częścią rusztowania, z którego użytkownicy języka korzystają przy budowaniu wypowiedzeń, a zarazem częścią gorsetu, krępującego naszą działalność mowną ale i nadającego ostateczny kształt wypowiedziom.[4]

The semantic structure of a language is partly lexically bound. It comprises the signifieds of lexical units available within the lexicon, together with their syntagmatic properties, i.e. the presence or absence of slots or valencies for combining with other signifieds. While some of the constraints seem to be syntactic and not semantic, nevertheless, even syntactic constraints oblige the speaker to re-arrange the encoding appropriately. To illustrate this point I will use either original examples appearing in [Mel'čuk 2004a] or similar examples from other languages. In some instances the analyses proposed here will differ from the original ones.

The first example concerns the difference between two Russian nouns *školnik* 'schoolchild, i.e. child or adolescent that goes to school' and *učenik* 'child or adolescent that goes to school X' [Mel'čuk 2004a: 40, original glosses slightly adapted]. According to Mel'čuk the noun *učenik* "has a SemA slot for the school, while its very close synonym *školnik* does not (because here 'school' is a constant)" This is illustrated by

(3.10a) *učeniki 276-oj školy*
'students of school 276'
(3.10b) * *školniki 276-oj školy*
'schoolkids of school 267'

At the first glance the absence for appropriate slot in the case of *školnik* seems to arise from the fact that while the signifieds of both nouns contain the component 'school', they differ as to further characteristics of the school: for *učenik* there is an opening for the name or number of the school (school X), while for *školnik* there is not.

Nevertheless, the absence of the slot for the name or number of the school may not be due to just to the fact that the school is a constant for *školnik.* I believe that the difference is more complex and has to do with the fact that the word 'school', used in the gloss, is ambiguous and in each of the glosses is taken in a different sense. In one sense it refers to the level of education, i.e. here school is opposed to kindergarden on one side and university on the other, and that is the sense in which it is used in the gloss for *školnik.* In the other sense school is a particular institution within the entire school system, with its teaching staff, classrooms, janitors etc. The ambiguity is further borne out by the fact that the appearance of the noun *školnik* in an utterance does not preclude mentioning some type or group of schools, as can be seen in the following quotes from actual legal documents.[5]

(3.11a) Каждый школьник имеет право на переход в другую школу, параллельный класс при наличии свободного места (Устав школы гл 2 п 4.1, Закон РФ гл5 ст50 п 2,19)'
'Every schoolchild has a right to transfer to a different school, [or] parallel class, provided there is a vacancy.'

[4] Lit. "is a part of the scaffolding that the speakers use to construct their utterances, and at the same time a part of the corset that restricts our linguistic activity, but also gives the final shape of what we say." [translation mine]
[5] I am indebted to Wojciech Sosnowski for finding these examples for me. The actual source is http://pedagog-club.narod.ru/declaration2001.htm

(3.11b) Каждый школьник имеет право участвовать в управлении школой в форме, определяемой Уставом школы (Устав школы гл.2 п.4.1, Декларация прав школьника ст.10 п.1.2, Закон РФ гл.5 ст 50 п.4
Every schoolchild has a right to participate in the management of the school in the form stipulated in School Regulations.'

Most likely, there are actually two lexical units represented by the string *škola*. Actually, in (3.11a) the noun *škola* is used in the sense 'particular institution', while in (3.11b) it is used in the sense 'particular institution' in the first instance, while in the second it is most likely used in the sense 'school system'. The evidence for that comes from the fact that *Zakon školy* ('School Regulations') is a part of the National School Bill. Similar situation obtains as well for Polish equivalent string *szkoła*. For example an utterance

(3.12) *Janek poszedł do szkoły*

is ambiguous and may mean that he went to school or that he started school.[6]

If the analysis proposed here is right, the Russian nouns in question are not as close synonyms as they appear to be at the first glance, since their meaning is not equivalent. Consequently, the differences observed are semantic in nature. By contrast, if postulating two different lexical units represented by the string *škola* is too far-fetched, , the incorrectness, or in terms of Encoding Grammar, the impossibility to construct (3.10b) is syntactic, and not semantic.

Another example of a syntactic and not semantic constraint on valencies can be made out of Polish equivalent of another sense of Russian *učenik*, i.e. *uczeń* (in the sense of 'disciple'). Both in Polish and in Russian the respective lexical units take the name of the person the disciple studies with in the genitive, as in *učenik Apresjana* 'Apresjan's disciple' [Mel'čuk 2004a: 41] and *uczeń Apresjana* 'id.', but not the name of the discipline studied, *učenik*lingvistiki/*po lingvistike/*v lingvistike* [Mel'čuk 2004a: 41] and **uczeń lingwistyki*. Nevertheless in Polish the constraint is syntactical. If the name of the master appears, the discipline can be introduced through a phrase *w zakresie* 'in the field of', as in *uczeń Apresjana w zakresie lingwistyki*. Interestingly, in Polish in such sentences the sense is not that of 'follower', as given for Russian by Mel'čuk 2004a: 62]: "The correct sentence *V lingvistike Petja — učenik Apresjana* 'In linguistics, Pete is a disciple of Apresjan' features still another lexeme: UČENIK3 ≈ 'follower'."[7]

Another interesting example of a syntactic-semantic and not purely semantic constraint concerns the verb *to cost* and its Polish equivalent *kosztować*. As Mel'čuk [2004a: 16] writes:

[6] A similar case can be made for English.

[7] In Polish the direct translation of the Russian sentence will mean the same. However, fronting the element *v lingvistike* encodes contrastive topicalization ('as for linguistics, as opposed to other things'), which is absent in *uczeń Apresjana w zakresie lingwistyki* 'a disciple of Apresjan in linguistics'.

> The verb [to] COST (as in *The book cost him $50*) describes the situation of selling/buying in which you have to pay, so that the Payee as an obligatory participant is unquestionable: Definition 1 guarantees the presence of the Payee participant in SIT(cost); the obligatory participant inheritance principle also requires it, since the meaning '[to] cost' includes '[to] pay' and '[to] pay' presupposes the Payee. However, it is impossible to express the Payee in a clause with [to] COST: *The book cost him $50 *to /for/with John*" .

However, further on [Mel'čuk 2004a: 61] he adds:

> In reality, the situation with [to] COST is more complex than my description suggests. In *This book costs $30 at McMillan's*, the phrase *at McMillan's* may be considered as an expression of the payee: it is not a simple locative circumstantial, isofunctional with *in New York* or *on a plane.*

Thus it seems that English the Payee can be expressed with the verb *to cost*, provided it is an institutional Payee, and not a person. If that is the case, the constraint is not on the verb *to cost* as such, but is due to the lack of appropriate preposition that would link the verb with a non-institutional Payee. Interestingly, in Polish both the institutional and non-institutional payee can be expressed, but with a different preposition:

(3.13) *Ta książka kosztuje 300 zł w księgarni/u Janka*
'This book costs 300 ZPL in a bookstore/at John (i.e. if you buy it from John)'

Additionally, (3.13) illustrates another feature of the semantic structure of Polish. Namely, both the preposition *w* and the preposition *u* can be used to encode the relation between a service (including selling goods) a provider, who in the case of the verb 'cost' becomes the Payee), thus their semantic structure is similar. However, the semantic structure of such *w* differs from the semantic structure of such *u* inasmuch that each specify the institutional vs. non-institutional provider. Incidentally, the institutional provider has to be bodily accessible to the purchaser. If it is not, as is the case of on-line purchases, the preposition is *na* (cf. *na Amazonie* 'at/from Amazon').

Another instance of semantic-syntactic constraint on a lexical unit is provided by two senses of the Polish verb *jechać*, one corresponding to English 'ride' and another to English 'drive' [Kopcińska, Linde-Usiekniewicz 2010: 156]. With both senses the information about the velocity of movement can be expressed, however, in the sense 'ride' never as a direct circumstantial of the surface verb:

(3.14a) **Jechał pociągiem z szybkością 200 km na godzinę.*
'He was going by train at a speed of 200 km per hour.'
(3.14b) *Jechał pociągiem mknącym z szybkością 200 km na godzinę.*
'He was going by train moving at 200 km per hour.'
(3.15a) ***Jechał nowiutkim porsche z szybkością 200 km na godzinę, wieziony przez rajdowego kierowcę***
'He was going in a new Porsche at a speed of 200 km per hour, driven by a professional rally-driver.'
(3.16a) *Jechał nowiutkim porsche wieziony z szybkością 200 km na godzinę przez rajdowego kierowcę.*
'He was going in a new Porsche, driven by a professional rally driver at a speed of 200 km per hour.'

The examples discussed so far show how the semantic structure of a language, embodied in lexical units, imposes syntactic constraints on the use of these units for encoding some part of the semantic representation of an utterance. Here I have focused on showing that the constraints are not in fact semantic, since they can be overcome by encoding the semantic relation that cannot be expressed through direct (syntactic) linking of the two signifieds by introducing yet another signified and thus linking the two original signifieds indirectly. Nevertheless, since the two original signifieds can be present in a single utterance, there is no semantic incompatibility involved.

In other cases, the incompatibility between the signifieds is purely semantic and thus they cannot be present in a single sentence. Again, examples abound, particularly, when one compares broadly equivalent lexical units from different languages.

The first example concerns the Russian preposition *iz-za* analysed in by Iordanskaya and Mel'čuk [2009: 6]. The authors write (original examples and glosses) that while:

(3.17a) *Ivan pogib iz-za svoej rassejannosti*
'Ivan died because of his absentmindedness'

is normal,

(3.17b) *#Ivan spassja iz-za svoej rassejannosti*
'Ivan was saved because of his absentmindedness'

"would be pragmatically bizarre", because "*spassja* (was saved) is, generally speaking, a desirable event, while the preposition IZ-ZA implies the absence of desirability of X for X's corresponding SemA or for the Speaker". Within the Encoding Grammar's framework one would say that the signified of *iz-za* contains the information that the outcome presented in the matrix clause governing the clause headed by the preposition *iz-za*, is bad. Thus, (3.17b) would be perfect should the semantic representation contain the information that the absentmindedness resulted in something good, as for example in the case in which Ivan, because of his absentmindedness, missed a particular plane, which crashed with everybody on board dying.[8]

A similar case, i.e. of the semantic structure of a linguistic unit in a given language specifying the valorization of arguments, can be made for the Polish verb *zdradzić*.[9] The verb is polysemous and in each sense involves different arguments, though all the senses have the disloyalty component in common. The first sense corresponds to revealing something that one was supposed not to:

(3.18) *Zdradzić komuś sekret / tajemnicę*
'to betray to somebody a secret'

[8] Iordanskaya, Mel'čuk [2009] actually analyze the issues involved in the use of *iz-za* as a wrong lexical choice, that for them is a part of a wrong Deep-Syntactic Representation, and not wrong Semantic Structure. Within the Encoding Grammar the semantic structure is never wrong – it may only be inappropriate to the relevant part of the semantic representation. By contrast, the semantic representation may be incorrect, if it contains a contradiction, or correct but unencodable in a given language. Thus several of the distinctions made by the authors are not relevant to what is proposed within this book.

[9] The example has been inspired by Mel'čuk's [2004a: 17] example of *predatel'* 'traitor', and particularly by the verb *predat'*.

The signified for this sense involves some piece of information and a person it is revealed to. The second sense concerns changing of one's loyalties, as in:

(3.19a) *Zdradzić ideały / ojczyznę / naukę / przyjaciól*
'to betray one's ideals/motherland/academia/one's friends.

Importantly the signified for this sense also involves yet another participant, i.e. the valuable thing one gains in the situation where one no longer holds to the old loyalties

(3.19b) *Zdradzić ideały / ojczyznę /naukę /przyjaciół dla pieniędzy / poklasku / sławy*
'to betray one's ideals/motherland/academia /one's friends for money/admiration/glory

and additionally, the things given up must be of greater worth at least in the opinion of the speaker that the gained ones. This is true even if the participant introduced by the preposition *dla* 'for' represents another, equally praiseworthy loyalty, as in:

(3.19c) *Zdradzić przyjaciół dla ojczyzny*
'to betray one's friends for one's country'[10]
(3.19d) *Zdradzić ojczyznę dla przyjaciół*
'to betray one's country for one's friend'

Importantly, although in the 'reveal' sense of *zdradzić*, and also the third sense that refers to sexual misbehavior as in:

(3.20) *Zdradzić żonę / męża*
'to cheat on one's husband / wife'

the expression *dla pieniędzy* 'for money' can appear, nevertheless its status is different: it refers to the motivation or the payment for the act. Thus

(3.21) *Zdradzić żonę / męża dla pieniędzy*
'to cheat on one's husband / wife for money'

would mean that somebody cheated on their spouse because they were being paid for it.

Other well-known examples concern Russian *plakat* 'to weep' [Mel'čuk 2004a: 12] that can refer only to shedding tears in reaction to a strong emotion, while its Polish equivalent can refer as well to tears flowing because of an irritant.

(3.22a) *Płakać z gniewu/z radości/z rozpaczy*
'to weep with (lit. of) anger/joy/despair'
(3.22b) *Płakać od wiatru/od cebuli/od gazu łzawiącego*
'lit. to weep because of the wind/the onion/the teargas'

[10] Cf. the famous quote from E.M. Forster: "if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend I hope I should have the guts to betray my country." (E. Forster: *What I believe* in *Two cheers for democracy*)

However, the semantic structure of Polish allows to distinguish the two causes of tears by the use of appropriate prepositional phrase (headed by *z* and *od* respectively) in spite of the fact that all tests for polysemy seem to indicate that there is only one lexical unit *płakać* in Polish. Additionally, the semantic representation involved in (3.22b), but not in (3.22a) can be also encoded through another lexical unit, i.e. *łzawić*:

(3.23a) **Oczy mu łzawią z radości/z gniewu/z rozpaczy.*
'His eyes fill with tears because of anger/joy/despair'
(3.23b) *Oczy mu łzawią od wiatru/od cebuli/od gazu łzawiącego*
'His eyes fill with tears because of the wind/the onion/the teargas'

The presence of the verb *łzawić* in Polish and the absence of a similar verb in English is also a part of the semantic structures of the two languages.[11]

Another well-known example is that of the verb *to die*, that can be applied to any kind of death, independently of its cause, while in Polish the verb *umrzeć* means 'to die from natural causes, including illness' while *zginąć* means 'to die a violent death' (similarly in Russian *umeret'* vs. *pogibnut'* [cf. Mel'čuk 2004a: 28-29].

The semantic structure of a given language is not limited to syntagmatic relations between language units, but also involves paradigmatic relations, particularly polysemy.

3.4.2. Other Elements of Semantic Structure

In the previous section I have dealt with elements of semantic structure of a given language that are bound to particular lexical units. It would be however wrong to assume that the semantic structure is limited to the lexicon. Languages also differ as to what they are able to encode by non-lexical, i.e. syntactic and morphological means. There is no doubt that many categories cross-linguistically serve to encode similar components of meaning. The most widely recognized examples are mood and tense in independent clauses, number of nouns, gender on animate nouns (in languages that have grammatical gender of appropriate type), classifiers, etc. In syntax the distinction between surface subject and surface object serves to encode the semantic distinction between the participants of an event. In so-called free order languages, and also in languages with some specific constraints on the surface linear order, the actual sequence of sentence elements serves to encode the division into theme and rheme, which within Encoding Grammar is also a part of the semantic representation of an utterance.

A telling example of such phenomenon can be found in particular in Italian and Spanish[12]. In both languages the so called "left dislocation" or fronting of objects applies to themes and to rhemes. However, left disclocation of rhemes do not involve clitic reduplication, while in the case of fronted themes the reduplication is obligatory, as can be seen in the two examples taken from Rizzi [1997: 286, original glosses]:

[11] The verb *to water* that can be introduced in the gloss of (3.18b) has a more general meaning than *łzawić*, cf. *My mouth waters.*

[12] Rizzi [1997: 286] states "Some other langauges (e.g. French) do not seem to use a structural focus position, at least in over syntax". This is contradicted in [Hiligsmann, Rasier 2006: 180] who write: "l'antéposition du focus existe également en français" and give the example of: ***Zéro** elle m'a mis pour mon travail!* 'lit. Zero (i.e. F) she gave me for my work'.

(3.24a) *Il tuo libro. lo ho letto*
'Your book, I have read it'
(3.24b) *IL TUO LIBRO ho letto* (, non il suo)
'Your book I read (, not his)'

The same phenomenon in Spanish can be seen in the contrast between (3.25a), taken from Zubizarreta [1999: 4239] and (3.25b)

(3.25a) *MANZANAS compró Pedro (y no peras)*.
'Apples Peter bought (and not peaches)'
(3.25b) *Las manzanas, las compró Pedro*.
'As for apples, Peter bought them' (while other fruit was bought by somebody else

Another yet widely common way of encoding semantic relations is that of linking nouns and adjectives into attributive structures. All these features of languages determine what can be encoded in them and thus constitute elements of their semantic structures, though those I have mentioned so far are very general, i.e. either common to all languages (like distinguishing participants through surface syntactic assignment of some kind of subjecthood and non-subjecthood), or common to large groups of typologically similar languages.

Nevertheless, just as I concentrated, in the previous section, on elements of semantic structure somehow specific to a particular language and mostly dwelled on differences, in the present section I will also focus on elements of meaning that can be encoded syntactically in a given language that are somehow specific to that language.

The first group of example consists in the degree in which languages allow for appearance or non-appearance of default values. In Polish, one cannot describe a person as having a particular body part, unless the body part is further characterized [Świdziński 1999; Linde-Usiekniewicz 2001]. Thus we can say:

(3.26a) *dziewczyna o niebieskich oczach*
'. a/the girl with blue eyes; a blue-eyed girl'

but it is not possible to say

(3.26b) **dziewczyna o oczach*
'. a/the girl with eyes'

This constraint is not just related to the preposition *o*, since substituting the preposition *z* 'with' for *o* does not improve matters

(3.27a) *dziewczyna z niebieskimi oczami*
' a/the girl with blue eyes'
(3.27b) **dziewczyna z oczami*
' a/the girl with eyes'

Interestingly, in Polish it is difficult even to encode something that would correspond to English

(3.28a) *That girl with the eyes*

as

(3.28b) *Ta dziewczyna z takimi/tymi oczami.*
'lit. that girl with such/these eyes'

While in English it is possible in a purely anaphoric context, Polish would need the second pronoun (but not the first) to be deictic and accompanied by appropriate gesture showing how big or prominent the eyes are.

Another instance is that of the degree to which languages would allow an attributive construction consisting of a noun being syntactically modified by just another noun referring to some praiseworthy quality as in Polish *człowiek honoru* 'a man/a person of honor'. It seems that in Polish 'honor' is the only noun of this kind that can be so used; with *odwaga* 'courage' and *zasady* 'principles' this is not possible unless the courage or the principles are further specified:

(3.29a) **człowiek odwagi*
'a person of courage'
(3.29b) *człowiek wielkiej odwagi*
'a person of great courage'
(3.30a) **człowiek zasad*
'a person of principles'
(3.30b) *człowiek niezłomnych zasad*
'a person of stalwart principles'

Other languages use different nouns in that way, e.g. in Latin one finds: *illa exempli mulier, homo [iustus et] morum, gloriae homines* [Leuman, Hofmann, Szantyr 1972:70].[13] Interestingly, the constraints on abstract nouns thus used cannot be considered semantic, in the sense that those that can be thus used have an absolute meaning, while other do not, since in other syntactic patterns the same abstract nouns can be used without the adjective,

(3.31a) *wykazać się odwagą*
'to show courage
(3.31b) *z odwagą*
'with courage'
(3.32a) *człowiek z zasadami*
'a person of principles'
(3.32b) *kierować się zasadami*
'to be guided by principles'

Another type of feature of the semantic structure of a language is the fact that elision of subject-pronoun encodes co-referentiality, as in (2.22) and (2.24a, b) repeated here as (3.33a) (3.34a) and (3.35a) respectively and contrasted with their counterparts with subject pronoun present , but without a contrasting stress pattern, i.e. (3.33b), (3.34b) and (3.35b a) respectively:

(3.33a) *Ojcu*$_2$ *Ø*$_1$*powiedział, że Ø*$_1$ *zepsuł* ***swój***$_1$/***jego***$_2$ *zegarek.*

[13] I am indebted to Jarosław Jakielaszek for pointing it out to me and providing references.

'To father$_2$ [he$_1$] told that he$_1$ had broken his$_{1/2}$ watch.'

(3.33b) *Ojcu*$_2$ *Ø*$_1$*powiedział, że* on$_3$ *zepsuł* ***swój***$_3$/***jego***$_{1/2/4}$ *zegarek.*
'To father$_2$ [he$_1$] told that he$_3$ had broken his$_{1/2/3/4}$ watch.'

(3.34a) *Ojciec*$_1$ *dowiedział się, że* on$_2$ *zepsuł* ***swój***$_2$ *zegarek.*
The father$_1$ learned that he$_2$ had broken his$_2$ watch.'

(3.34b) *Ojciec*$_1$ *dowiedział się, że* on$_2$*zepsuł* ***swój***$_2$ *zegarek.*
The father$_1$ learned that he$_2$ had broken his$_2$ watch.'

(3.35a) *Ojciec*$_1$ *dowiedział się, że Ø*$_1$*zepsuł* ***jego***$_2$ *zegarek.*
The father$_1$ learned that [he$_1$] had broken his$_2$ watch.'

(3.35b) *Ojciec*$_1$ *dowiedział się, że on*$_2$ *zepsuł* ***jego***$_{1/3}$ *zegarek.*
The father$_1$ learned that he$_2$ had broken his$_{1/3}$ watch.

A completely different instance of semantic structure not corresponding to lexicon is provided by ordering of adjectives within the noun phrase. While some of the differences mentioned in *Why The Encoding Perspective* may be reduced to polysemy or homonymy and just be considered lexical in character, as for example for French *ancien* 'former; old' and for Polish *obcy* 'foreign; strange' and *kulturalny* 'culture (modifier); cultured', this is not the case for the difference expressed by preposing of Spanish adjectives that would normally be post-posed, as in the examples taken from Demonte [1999: 146]:

(3.36a) *las niñas tímidas*
lit. the girls shy'

(3.36b) *las tímidas niñas*
lit. the shy girls'

(3.37a) *las paredes verticales*
'lit. the walls vertical'

(3.37b) *las verticales paredes*
'lit. the vertical walls'

(3.38a) *los ojos hostiles*
'lit. the eyes hostile'

(3.38b) *los hostiles ojos*
'lit. the hostile eyes'

(3.39a) *el viejecito malhumorado*
'lit. the old man (dim) grumpy'

(3.39b) *el malhumorado viejecito*
'lit. the grumpy old man (dim)'

It is said that the post-nominal qualifying adjective is restrictive, i.e. "the nominal phrase refers to a determined (sub)set of objects—restricted by the adjective—which are singled out in a universe which presupposes other girls, walls, eyes or old men" [Demonte 1999: 146, translation mine]. By contrast where the adjective is pre-posed "there is no restriction, there is just a feature of the object mentioned" [Demonte 1999:146, translation mine]. Thus the position of the adjective seems to be related to its contribution to the scope of reference (specificity) of the noun. Pre-posed adjectives describe a property of an individual object or a group of objects already identifiable at least for the speaker, irrespectively of the actual use of the definite or the indefinite article. In particular this is borne out by Demonte's [1999: 197] examples:

(3. 40) *—¿Me comprarás esa moto?*

'Will you buy that motorbike for me?'
—*Una peligrosísima moto no te la compraré ni aunque me lo pidas de rodillas.*
Such a dangerous bike (lit. a dangerous (intensive) bike)', I will not buy you even if you asked on your bended knees'

Here the referent of the noun *moto* is contextually specified by the question featuring the demonstrative, therefore the adjective plays no role in specifying it further. However if there is no specifying available, the adjective needs to be placed post-nominally

(3.41) —*¿Que se necesita para esa fiesta?*
'What is needed for this party?'
—*Se necesita un vestido sencillo.*
'One needs a simple dress (lit. a dress simple).'

Yet another feature of the semantic structure of a language is the possibility of encoding different, actually contradictory senses, by means of auxiliary inversion, as in English (The examples are taken from [Lakoff, Brugman 1987]):

(3.42a) *By no means will he be allowed to stay in the country.*
(3.42b) *By no means, he will be allowed to stay in the country.*
(3.43a) *For no reason would Harry beat his wife.*
(3.43b) *For no reason, Harry would beat his wife.*
(3.44a) *For no money would she dance naked.*
(3.44b) *For no money, she would dance naked.*

The possibility of encoding different senses by syntactic configuration is not limited to English auxiliary inversion. Russian is well-known for the 'approximately' sense encoded by the inversion of noun-numeral sequence, as can be seen in the following examples, taken from [Zaroukian 2010]:

(3.45a) *Ivan pročital dvadcat' knig*
'Ivan read twenty books'
(3.45b) *Ivan pročital knig dvadcat'*
'Ivan read approximately twenty books'

It is also a matter of the semantic structure of a particular language whether it allows for "dash syntax", i.e. direct syntactic relation between two elements semantically linked only indirectly, as in Polish:

(3.46) *Za kradzież – dwa lata w zawieszeniu*
'lit. For theft – two years suspended'

with the semantic link 'the sentence is' unexpressed. This, at least in Polish, used to appear mostly on banners and other propagandist announcements.

The semantic structures of languages also differ as to the possibility of encoding relative clauses as defining or non-defining (by other means than the parenthetic intonation) and encoding in a special way the "third kind" relative clauses [Grosu, Landman 1998].

Interestingly enough, a possibility of encoding "kind" relatives [de Vries 2002] is available within the semantic structure of Polish through the use of *jaki* instead of *który* [cf. Przepiórkowski *et al.* 2002: 218; Buttler, Kurkowska, Satkiewicz 1971: 375-376], as can be seen by Polish translation of an example of a kind relative clause taken from de Vries [2002:27],

(3.47a) English: *Bush is not the politician that his father was.*
(3.47b) Polish: *Bush nie jest politykiem, jakim był jego ojciec.*

Even stronger evidence comes from a pair of Polish sentences:,

(3.48a) *Jan jest lekarzem, jakim był jego ojciec*
'lit. Jan is the doctor that his father was.'
(3.48a) *Jan jest lekarzem, *którym był jego ojciec.*
'lit. Jan is the doctor that his father was.'

Where (3.48b) is unacceptable, unless it is taken to mean Jan impersonates his father.

Finally, it is also the semantic structure of a particular language that determines the degree of metonymy available, for example expressing an event in terms of the event's participant, as illustrated by:

(3.49) *I want your report on my desk tomorrow morning*.[14]

While in English such expressions are quite common, they would be impossible in Polish, thus to encode the same semantic representation in Polish, the speaker would need to use verb *mieć* (3.48a) or a subordinate clause (3.48b):

(3.50a) *Chcę mieć jutro rano na biurku twoje sprawozdanie.*
'I want to have your report on [my] desk tomorrow morning.'
(3.50b) *Chcę, żeby twoje sprawozdanie j jutro rano znalazło się na moim biurku twoje sprawozdanie.*
'lit. I want that your report finds itself on my desk tomorrow morning.'

3.4.3. Semantic Structure Syntactically Expressed and Syntactic Structure

The claim that the semantic structure of a language manifests itself through syntactic phenomena rise the question about the distinction between syntactic means of encoding some parts of the semantic representation and the syntactic structure of the language, mentioned in 2.2 *The Architecture of The Encoding Grammar*. Roughly speaking, the syntactic structure of the language deals with the ways the deep syntactic representation is converted into the surface syntactic representation and does not affect meaning, while the semantic structure is

[14] http://framenet2.icsi.berkeley.edu/frameSQL/book/2_Frame_Development.html: An alternative analysis of such examples could involve the possibility of not encoding the event itself, similarly to what was proposed for (3.44). Evidence against such analysis of (3.47) comes from the absence of "dash intonation" necessary to encode (3.44.)

about meaning. Particulars of the syntactic structure will be dealt with in one of the following chapters (*The Encoding Grammar and Syntax*), here I will limit myself to just a couple of examples of features of syntactic structure of a language.

Thus, as I have already mentioned in the first section of the previous chapter (2.1 *Preliminaries*), as it is generally known the syntactic structure of English differs from the syntactic structure of Romance and Slavonic language insofar that it allows for passivization in which the indirect object of the active clause becomes the subject of the passive one, as in (2.4a, b), repeated here as (3.51a, b)

(3.51a) *X was told that…*
(3.51b) *X was given Y*

The second example concerns the possibility of ellipsis of the first and second person pronouns in Polish and Spanish, among other languages, in contrast to obligatory presence of such pronouns in English and French. In contrast to the presence or absence of the third person pronouns, discussed above (3.33) – (3.35), which encodes co-referentiality or lack thereof, the first and second person is encoded in Spanish and Polish in the appropriate verb form. As it is widely known, first and second person pronouns are not dropped in the two languages if they are marked as rheme or contrastive theme. Thus within the Encoding Grammar it is possible to say that the syntactic structure of Polish and Spanish allows for ellipsis of the first and second person pronouns if simple themes, while the syntactic structure of French and English do not. Appropriate examples are easy to come by, so I will just give one:

(3.52a) Polish: *Czytałam tę książkę.*
(3.52b) Spanish: *He leido el libro.*
(3.52c) French: *J'ai lu le livre.*
(3.52d) English: *I have you read the book.*

Yet another well-known instance involves the possibility of encoding the interrogative meaning in the yes/no questions by intonation alone, without interrogative particle or other adjustments to surface syntax. Here languages may differ as to whether they possess two ways, like Polish on the one hand, in which the interrogative particle *czy* is optional, or just one, as in Spanish:

(3.53a) Polish: *Czy przeczytałaś tę książkę?/*
Przeczytałaś tę książkę
(3.53b) Spanish: *¿Has leido el libro?*

3.5. Encoding Strategies.

There is one more question one has to take into account when discussing meaning within the Encoding Grammar. Although the presentation of the framework here deals with single sentences, people normally do not talk in isolated utterances and may rely on conveying some piece of information at a later stage, provided the semantic representation of the first utterance does not contradict what the speaker wants to convey. On the other hand, they may want to encode all the relevant information at every opportunity, at the cost of possible redundancy.

The two strategies can be named "opportunistic" and "pedantic". To illustrate the two concepts I will use the female lawyer example, already invoked in the previous chapter. It is normal in English not to encode gender of a professional when encoding the profession itself. Thus an English-speaking person could simply say:

(3.54) *I called my lawyer.*

and encode the gender at later stage or correct the sexist assumption of their addressee, should the latter ask:

(3.55) *And what did he say?*

This is an example of the opportunistic strategy. The pedantic strategy would call for saying instead of 3.54, something like:

(3.54) *I called my lady lawyer/female lawyer.*

that would be completely unidiomatic.

Yet another example can be made out the semantic representation concerning onion bringing tears to somebody's eyes (cf. (3.22a, b – 3.23a, b). If a speaker of Polish says, :

(3.55) *Makijaż mi się rozmazał, bo kroiłam cebulę i się popłakałam.*
'My make-up has run because I have been chopping onions and started to weep'

they are using the opportunistic strategy, and the sentence is potentially ambiguous and may be also used in reference to the situation in which the person in question was chopping onions and started to cry because they suddenly felt angered, humiliated or whatever by the mere fact of being relegated to such menial domestic chore or because they remembered, while chopping the onions, something that evoked a strong emotion. Using the pedantic strategy the person would say:

(3.55) *Makijaż mi się rozmazał, bo kroiłam cebulę i oczy zaczęły mi łzawić.*
'My make-up has run because I have been chopping onions and my eyes started to water.

In some cases there is only one, either opportunistic or pedantic, strategy available to the speaker, because of a particular feature of the semantic structure of a given language. It would be however wrong to assume that some languages are more pedantic or more opportunistic in their semantic structure as the whole. Additionally, pedantic vs. opportunistic encoding is a matter of choice. Choices are mostly affected by linguistic habits of the individual speaker or by the register or style of the actual text they are producing, and thus fall beyond the scope of the Encoding Grammar.