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II

The Encoding Perspective Embodied: The Encoding Grammar

2.1. Preliminaries

In the previous chapter I have briefly argued that the encoding perspective imposed on either a model of language that mirrors both producing of utterances and understanding them, as Meaning \Leftrightarrow Text Model does, or on a model oriented to pattern, but presented dynamically as the production of utterances, as the Functional Discourse Grammar is constructed, may not be enough to explain how in actual utterances the potential conflict between language-specific constraints and the thoughts the speaker is willing to express through language. The Encoding Grammar I will be sketching in this chapter is supposed to offer a framework within which these conflicts can be made explicit and the way how they are resolved, i.e. the compromises reached, presented. Although, as I have said in the previous chapters, instances of collaboration can be explained without reference to actual encoding, the Encoding Grammar is able to account for them as well.

The Encoding Grammar is supposed to account for both core and peripheral linguistic phenomena. The terms have been used by Sgall [2009: 1] and he associates the distinction with the notion of markedness:

The notion of markedness offers the option to understand the core of language as exhibiting a relatively simple patterning. [...] The periphery, on the other hand, is altogether more complex. It covers the relationships between underlying representations and morphemics (with its irregularities), including idiosyncratic syntactic constructions, portmanteau morphemes, multiword items, and the like. It contains not only individual exceptions, but also a large range of rules (or regularities) meeting certain contextual restrictions; these can at least partly be characterized by lists and analogy. The fuzzy borderlines and the vastness of language (especially of its periphery) may be studied by methods working with concepts such as megacollection or semiset.

My understanding of the opposition between core and periphery within language is somehow different. For some time I have been claiming that:

Pewne zjawiska powierzchniowe, głównie marginalne w systemie języka, zwłaszcza takie, które w gramatykach formalnych padają ofiarą tzw. „idealizacji” danych albo są traktowane jako wyjątki „leksykalne”, można wyjaśnić w sposób odwołujący się do systemu języka, jako efekt działania

konfliktów, kompromisów, a czasem współpracy składni, semantyki i struktury informacyjnej w języku [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2012]¹

Although I do not mention morphology in the quote, I do not think it is peripheral to language as such and neither is lexicon. In fact, lexicon and morphology can be thought as peripheral only if one assumes the centrality of syntax, which Sgall actually does. Also there is a widely held belief that morphology and lexicon are highly language specific, while syntax may be more universal. This belief is not restricted to Generative Grammar. For example Mel'čuk [2004b: 249] writes that his deep syntactic structure “it must be cross-linguistically universal in that it uses a universal inventory of D[EEP]Synt[ACTIC]-relations”.

The notion of markedness is also important for the Encoding Grammar, though it needs to be disambiguated before it is applied within the framework. First of all markedness initially referred to phonological oppositions, with one of the members bearing a feature, and one not. At later stage it was extended, by Roman Jakobson to morphological and by the same token to semantic oppositions with the marked element being characterized by a feature absent in the unmarked ones. A classic example is that of gendered and ungendered animate and personal nouns: the English noun *lioness* is marked for female gender while the noun *lion* is not, and can be used in reference to both females and males of the species. This asymmetry can be invoked for oppositions within morphological categories [Linde-Usiekniewicz 1991] and in lexical semantics [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2000; 2002]. However, modern linguistics uses the notion of markedness in a different way, as can be seen in Sgall's [2009]: as referring to a more complex, less straightforward entities and configurations. I will argue that within the Encoding Grammar markedness of surface representations is, in many instances, but not all, related to the fact that the encoding of the meaning has not been progressing in the most simple way. Thus for example the Encoding Grammar would show (as other frameworks do) that cleft sentences are marked, while their uncleft counterparts may be not, or that non-canonical word orders are marked. Moreover, the Encoding Grammar would try to account for the fact that not only the opposition between marked and unmarked instances can be made, but also for the fact that marked sentences and utterances can differ as to the degree of their markedness [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2012].

The background idea, crucial for the Encoding Grammar, is that the speakers want to express their thoughts in the best possible way available to them, that is to say at least some things in such way that their intended meaning can be decoded, and not left to be understood as implied [Grice 1975: 24-25] or left to be inferred. In addition, the Encoding Grammar has to cope with the well-known fact that in a given language some things are easier to encode than in others. However, it is also meant to show that more things are sayable in a given language that we ordinary think, though saying them (i.e. encoding them) may be not straightforward and may rely on using indirect linguistic devices, i.e. not usually associated, at least in linguistic theories, with encoding some specific parts of meaning. Some easily invoked instances include Polish using theme-rheme distinction to mark definiteness, as in

(2.1a) *Przed nocą dotarli do wioski*

¹ “Some surface phenomena, mainly considered peripheral, and in particular those that in formal grammars fall victims to so called „idealization of data” or are treated as “lexical” exceptions can be explained within the language system, as a result of conflicts, compromises and sometimes collaboration between syntax, semantics and information structure” [translation mine]. This idea has been first presented in 2007, when I still tried to work within the notion of language as independent from the speaker. As could be seen in the previous chapter and will be discussed later on, the speaker is involved in some of the conflicts and in reaching the compromises.

‘They reached a village by nightfall’

vs.

(2.1b) *Do wioski dotarli przed nocą*
They reached the village by nightfall.’

Another example is that of agreement between adjective and noun: while it is generally thought to mark syntactic relations, as in ordinary attributive configurations, in predicative configurations, i.e. nominal predicates and secondary predicates, it marks the semantic relation and not a syntactic one, as is repeatedly mentioned by Mel’čuk (2009: 15], among others²:

(2.2) *Ja znala ego molod+ym.*
‘I (female) knew **him** (when he was) young (masculine singular)’
Ja znala eë molod+oj.
‘I (female) knew **her** (when she was) young (feminine singular)’
Ja znala ix molod+ymi
‘I (female) knew **them** (when they were) young (plural)’

As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, within the Encoding Grammar the relative simplicity of encoding something or, conversely the lack of such simplicity is not seen as question of strategy a language adopts, but a solid feature of a given language that the speaker has to contend and cope with. Nevertheless, the notion of strategy is not completely absent: strategy refers to choices made by the speaker within the array of linguistic means available within a given language.

It is further assumed that speakers have total control of all the devices they are going to use throughout the entire process of encoding. As could be inferred from what has been said so far, the Encoding Grammar is stratificational in nature, and possesses at least a semantic level, a syntactic level, a morphological level, not to mention the “phonological” one, i.e. the one on which the utterance acquires its fully observable shape. Besides, it obviously starts from the semantic level and proceeds towards the observable one. In terms of strategy and choices this corresponds to the idea that the speaker uses appropriate means available at each level. In order to account for the way the meaning is encoded it would mean that at each stage of the encoding process the speaker is also aware of means available at the following level(s). As a simple illustration, let us use the MC announcements (1.2ab) from the previous chapter.

In both (1.2a) and (1.2b) it is assumed that the speakers want to present the singing as thematic part of utterance. In order to encode this in English they must present the singing not as an activity, but indirectly, through mentioning the person performing the activity, since English will not allow its speaker to encode an activity (and a lexical verb) as theme. The syntactic arrangement is geared to the nominal presentation of the activity and the entire sentence receives the pattern with the nominal predicate and of an identificational sentence (1.2.b), repeated here as (2.3a):

² The distinction between semantic, syntactic and morphological dependency is presented in most works on MTM.

(2.3a) *The singer is X.*

The speaker of Polish, Spanish or German when encoding the same meaning knows that Polish, Spanish or German respectively allows for verbal themes and sentence initial verbs if they are themes, therefore presents the singing as an activity, and at the (deeper) syntactic level the sentence has the same representation (be it phrase-structure representation or dependency representation) as the sentence with canonical order, with the verb still marked as theme.³ This syntactic representation receives the appropriate linearization at the surface syntactic level and the appropriate intonation pattern at the phonological level.⁴ Thus the final version for each language is (1.1a), repeated here as (2.3.b):

(2.3b) Polish: *Śpiewa X.*
 Spanish: *Canta X.*
 German: *Es singt X,*

Similarly, speakers of languages that allow for initial rhemes need not to resort to cleft sentences for marking some part of their sentences as rheme.

Likewise, speakers of English are quite comfortable with choosing verbs like *give* or *tell*, even if they do not want to mention the person who is giving something or telling something to another person, provided they will express the receiver/audience and the thing given/said, and they would like to have the receiver/audience as the initial element of their sentence (for example to make it a theme), since English possesses an appropriate passive construction.

(2.4a) *X was told that...*
 (2.4b) *X was given Y*

Speakers of Spanish would rather choose verbs meaning something similar to ‘learn’ and ‘receive’ in order to express the same meaning (or they need to complicate the encoding in the way presented below in (2.8a))

(2.5a) Spanish: *X supo que...*
 ‘X learned that...’
 (2.5b) *X recibió Y*
 ‘X received Y’

Polish speakers have to use the verb meaning ‘to receive’ but need not to choose the verb meaning ‘to learn’: Polish verb *poinformować* ‘to inform’ expresses the person being told as a direct object, thus it is possible to say both:

(2.6a) Polish: *X dowiedział się, że ...*

³ This is presented explicitly in the following section.

⁴ Indirectly, while commenting on this example the distinction between a deep syntactic level and a surface syntactic level has been mentioned. The Encoding Grammar needs both of them and the reasons will be discussed further on.

- (2.6b) 'X learned that....
X został poinformowany, że...
 'X was informed that'

While in the case of giving and receiving the situation is similar to Spanish:

- (2.7) Polish: *X dostał/otrzymał Y*
 'X received Y'

Speakers of both Spanish and Polish have another means of obviating the person telling/giving: the so called impersonal sentences. However in these sentences special procedures are necessary in order to have the addressee/receiver expressed as themes and the appropriate sentences are marked:

- (2.8a) Spanish: *A X le dijeron que...*⁵
 'To X him [they] told that'
A X le dieron Y
 'To X him [they] gave Y'
- (2.8b) Polish: *X-owi powiedzieli/powiedziano, że...*⁶
 'To X [they] told that'
X-owi dali/dano Y
 To X [they] gave Y'

Within the framework of the Encoding Grammar it is assumed that the speaker not only has a total awareness of available means and a complete control over their use, but also to use Mel'čuk's [1988: 46] formula: "In an idealized situation of linguistic₁ communication, the speaker knows what he is going to say". Encoding Grammar is an idealization of producing of utterances. For example, the assumption that the speakers knows what they are going to say before the encoding starts is not based on any psycholinguistic data. Just the opposite:

There is a consensus in the psycholinguistic literature that language production is incremental, in the sense that pre-linguistic conceptualizations arise gradually through time (in microseconds, it should be said) and that material is sent ahead for encoding before the entire communicative intention has been fully developed. [Hengeveld, Mackenzie 2008:24]

It should be noted that 'what the speaker is going to say' within the Encoding Grammar is not the same as the communicative intention mentioned above. Encoding Grammar deals only with what the speaker will actually say in the sense specified above.⁷

Moreover, the Encoding Grammar is not concerned with the speakers judging the likelihood of obtaining the desired communicative effect upon the addressees, because actually they have no means of controlling the outcome. Here is where the proposed framework differs sharply from all communication oriented approaches, including the

⁵ In Spanish the impersonal verb form is homonymous with 3rd person plural. Both *a X* and *le* are dative forms.

⁶ In Polish there are two impersonal forms that can be used here: one ending in *-o* (*dano, powiedziano*) and one homonymous with 3rd person plural, as in Spanish (*powiedzieli, dali*). Both tend to precede its nominal complements in unmarked situations (see supra).

⁷ This will be dealt on in further chapters of the book

Relevance Theory. Encoding Grammar does not hold the speaker responsible for the outcomes of all kind of processing the produced text is submitted to.

The speakers construed within the framework proposed here thus may be said to appear as an extremely arrogant beings, not caring about the totality of effect their utterances have on people. Since Encoding Grammar is not a model of communication, it limits itself to obligating speakers to encode precisely what they have decided to encode, given the constraints of the language they design themselves or are obliged to speak.

2.2. The Architecture of the Encoding Grammar

As I have said in the previous chapter the Encoding Grammar tries to provide a balance between *parole* phenomena and *langue* phenomena. The former are represented throughout the book as dependent mainly on the speaker's wish to say what they would like to say, while the latter deal with means offered by a particular language and with constraints it imposes. Thus to sketch how the Encoding Grammar works it is necessary to start with the distinction between the two phenomena.

It is obvious enough that the Encoding Grammar needs to start with meaning (or intended meaning) that will be encoded and the endpoint should be a string of sounds, graphic characters or, should the language chosen for encoding be a sign language, a sequence of signs⁸. However, it is equally obvious that it is not plausible to present encoding as a simple match between some meanings and some surface sequences of perceivable phenomena. As I have said in the previous section, the Encoding Grammar is stratificational, i.e. it involves different levels of encoding. For reasons I will explain in more detail later on, it seems that for the Encoding Grammar we need a well-known distinction between lexicon, syntax and morphology, since different elements of meaning can be encoded lexically, syntactically and morphologically. The Encoding Grammar will thus need several encoding modules, which will be briefly presented here and discussed further on in following chapters. The meaning to be encoded belongs to *parole*, while encoding modules account for both *langue* and *parole* phenomena. The *langue* part of each module corresponds to what is obligatory at a given level of encoding and to what is allowable, and will be from now on referred to as *structure* (unless in quotes from other authors). The actual choice between different allowable courses of encoding belong again to *parole*. Both the results of such choices will be from now on referred to as *representations* (again unless in quotes from authors).

In order to show how the Encoding Grammar is supposed to work let us start with some meaning, i.e. what the speakers know they are going to say. For the purpose of the Encoding Grammar the meaning is highly language independent, since a bilingual or a multilingual individual may opt for saying something in each of the language they know. Nevertheless, it can be in part conditioned by linguistic habits imposed by languages the individual speaks [Slobin 1996] and may influence their decision of what to encode and what to leave to inference.

⁸ I am convinced that sign languages should be classified together with phonic languages as natural languages, thus an Encoding Grammar for each of the sign language could be established. However, my knowledge of sign languages is too sketchy to provide sign languages examples to illustrate facets of Encoding Grammar. Thus these languages will be mentioned only when the theory of Encoding Grammar is discussed.

Thus a speaker faced with an offer of a cup of coffee may opt for encoding the information about the effect the coffee would have on them and choose just that as their meaning to be encoded. Should they decide to encode it in English, after the encoding is carried out the produced utterance will have the form discussed by Sperber and Wilson [Sperber, Wilson 1986: 11, 16, 34, 35, 56, 167]:

(2.9a) *Coffee would keep me awake.*

with the acceptance or rejection not encoded but left to be inferred by the audience. Should the speaker decide to encode exactly the same meaning in Polish, the eventual utterance would be:

(2.9b) Polish: *Po kawie nie będę spać.*

However, this is not the most natural way to either accepting or rejecting the coffee in Polish. The speaker of Polish would either say:

(2.10) Polish: *Po kawie nie zasnę.*
‘I will not (be able to) sleep after coffee’

thus encoding if not the actual refusal, at least the fact that the effect of the coffee on them, i.e. the presumed alertness, is not desirable, or say

(2.11) Polish: *Po kawie nie będzie mi się chciało spać.*
‘I will not feel sleepy after coffee’

thus encoding at least the fact that the presumed alertness is desirable.

Nevertheless, should the ambiguity be necessary, for example when providing translation for a movie in which the issue of drinking or not drinking the coffee is a part of a longer scene, one may have to use (2.9b), despite its relative unnaturalness.

On the other hand, not every and all elements of meaning may be explicitly encoded. When a speaker of English says:

(2.12a) *I called my lawyer, in one of those midtown firms, and she said...*⁹

the meaning ‘female’ is not encoded within the word *lawyer*, nevertheless it constitutes a part of the meaning that controls the form of the pronoun.

Within the Encoding Grammar the meaning available for encoding is represented as the semantic representation of the utterance. It is assumed that such representation is made up of some semantic prime-like elements and semantic relations between them. It also contains the division into themes and rhemes (both issues are addressed in respective chapters *Encoding Grammar And Semantics* and *Encoding Grammar And Theme-Rheme Divisions*). Similar to Meaning ⇔ Text Model, the semantic representation within the Encoding Grammar should be a graph.¹⁰

⁹ This sentence is a quote from Amanda Cross, *Sweet Death, Kind Death*, 1984, New York; Ballantine, p. 88

¹⁰ The semantic representation within the Encoding Grammar does not correspond exactly to semantic representation within the Meaning ⇔ Text Model, nor does it correspond to semantic structure within that model

Such semantic representation is subjected to encoding in which first of all chunks of meaning are connected in configurations that match the signifieds of lexical units available in the language in which the sentence or the utterance will be produced. Since lexical units have their own syntactic requirements, these requirements, and not only the components of meaning are also playing a role in the way the lexical stage of encoding proceeds. The lexical units chosen have to satisfy or at least not prevent the satisfaction of the division into themes and rhemes.

For example, should the speaker wish to encode the meaning related to the fact that someone was bodily assaulted, and to encode it in English, without however having the identity of the attacker as a part of the meaning the English language offers them a long series of synonyms (i.e. *knock, bang, whack, cuff* etc.) The appropriate lexical unit will be chosen accordingly to the strength of the assault, the body part hit, etc. that have to be specified within the semantic representation. However, all the potential verbs to be used are transitive verbs and take the lexical unit referring to the attacker as their surface subject in the active voice and the one referring to the victim as its direct object. Thus in order to be able to satisfy the requirements of the meaning whichever verb is chosen it will be subjected to passivization in the further stage of encoding. By contrast, should the same meaning be encoded in Polish, besides transitive verbs corresponding to English ones (*uderzyć, walnąć*) there is an intransitive verb *oberwać* that takes the lexical unit corresponding to the assaultee as its surface subject¹¹.

Thus both English and Polish allow to encode the same meaning including deletion of one of the participants of the assault-act, and to have the victim's identity as theme:

- (2.13) English: *John got whacked on the head.*
 Polish: *Jan oberwał w głowę.*

If a signified of a lexical unit does not match the meaning, another lexical unit has to be chosen at this stage. Let us imagine that the semantic representation of our utterance-to-be contains the information about a bird flying at considerable distance from the ground. Both in English and in Polish the terms related to the sense of 'height/wysokość' are applicable here, since in both languages it can be applied both to dimension and to distance (cf. *high branch/wysoka gałąź* [Lang 1989; 1995; 2001 for English; Linde-Usiekniewicz 2000, 2002, 2003 for Polish]. However, in Polish while the meanings of the noun *wysokość* 'height' and the adverb *wysoko* 'high' are such that they can be applied both to dimension and to distance, the evaluative adjective (as in the branch example) can be used only with nouns which refer to entities that are by definition positioned at some distance from the ground¹², and a bird is not. Thus in Polish the meaning presented above cannot be encoded as **wysoki ptak* when it is flying high, while in English it seems acceptable.¹³

Not entire semantic contents of an utterance-to-be is encoded through appropriate signifieds: only those where the syntactic properties of the lexical unit that matches the appropriate chunk of meaning allow for appropriate encoding of other components of

[Linde-Usiekniewicz 2012]. The differences between the Encoding Grammar and the MTM will be addressed in the next section, and this particular distinction will be dealt with in *Encoding Grammar And Semantics*.

¹¹ This example roughly resembles the giving/telling situation discussed in the previous section.

¹² This is an oversimplified account of meaning of Polish dimensional adjectives. The semantics of distance sense of the *wysoki* is presented in Linde-Usiekniewicz 2000: 193-199.

¹³ For example in Wilbur Smith, *Men of Men*, one of the protagonists says of a falcon: 'She went for the high bird'.

meaning, including division into theme and rheme. If there is no appropriate unit, a combination of several ones, related syntactically is chosen. Thus in Polish one can address or refer to a young man either by a single noun *młodzieniec* ‘(male) youth’ and by a phrase *młody człowiek* ‘young man’; however it lacks a corresponding single noun for a young female and the only possible expression is *młoda dama* ‘young lady’.¹⁴

The semantic relation of attributing a feature to an entity, as in *młody człowiek*, *młoda dama* and in *young man*, *young lady* is also encoded as a syntactic relation. However, as Mel’čuk [2004a: 20-21] rightly points out, while the semantic relations is such that the meaning of the noun corresponds to the semantic argument and the meaning of adjective to the semantic predicate, so that meaning of the noun is semantically subordinate to the meaning of the adjective, the appropriate syntactic relations are reverse: the adjective is subordinate to the noun.

Other components of meanings, which are not matched by signifieds are encoded by introducing syntactic relations between chunks of otherwise encodable meaning. Here languages tend to differ as to what meanings can be encoded through syntax, without matching some signified (and later on the corresponding signifiers) with the appropriate meaning. One such case has been presented by Mel’čuk [1988:341-355; 2009: 252-253] for Russian, although in relatively marginal area of syntax, i.e. introducing direct speech. In such situation Russian (and Polish) do not need an overt speech verb to appear (The Russian example and the English gloss are taken from [Mel’čuk 2009: 252]).

- (2.14) Russian: *Da kak ty smeeš! — rasserdilsja Ivan.*
‘lit. “But how dare you!”, became-angry Ivan’
““How dare you!”, said Ivan angrily’
Polish: — *Jak śmiesz! — rozgniewał się Jan.*

Even in speech, without the dashes, the sentence means that Ivan said angrily what he did say, and Mel’čuk’s account which postulates a fictitious lexeme ‘say’ for such utterances can be adopted for the Encoding Grammar, although in contrast to the Meaning \leftrightarrow Text Model, the Encoding Grammar would have the meaning of ‘say’ encoded as a direct syntactic relation between what was said and getting angry in Polish and in Russian and through the signifier ‘say’ in English¹⁵.

So far the encoding process has been presented mainly as matching of some configurations of meanings with lexical units presented as signifiers and other configurations of meanings with syntactic relations between the signifiers. If at this stage all the contents has been successfully encoded the appropriate configuration becomes sort of blocked, i.e. no subsequent encoding procedure can introduce or delete any part of the meaning. The result would be a straightforward, active, canonical sentence of the language in question. These

¹⁴ All three expressions are old-fashioned and nowadays could be taken as patronizing and maybe even downright ageist.

¹⁵ Mel’čuk [2004b: 253] keeps the fictitious lexeme as a part of the Deep Syntactic configuration corresponding to this sentence and gets rid of it only at the Surface Syntactic level. Encoding direct speech passages within narrative passages is discussed at length in 6.3 *A Case Study of Collaborative Effort: Direct Speech in Narratives*. Semantic elements without appropriate segmental (phonological) signifiers have also been used to account for elective constructions [Linde-Usiekniewicz, Derwojedowa 2006] and for the superlative [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2010]. These accounts are however inconsistent with the framework proposed in this book and need to be re-analysed.

cases would be unmarked ones in the second sense the marked/unmarked distinction mentioned in the previous sections.

However, even in fairly uncomplex situations the Encoding Grammar has to wait till the syntactic configuration is further specified in syntax before appropriate signifieds are chosen¹⁶. This situation is however restricted to anaphora and other cases of co-referentiality. Simply, whenever the semantic representation is such that in order to be encoded, some meaning configuration has to be represented twice, the decision which instance is encoded by a full lexeme and which by a pronoun or a pronoun-like lexical unit and be the same token the actual encoding of each instance may depend on surface linear order. [Mel'čuk 2004b: 248]. This fairly obvious point can be illustrated by the situation presented in (2.12), repeated here in a shortened version as (2.15):

(2.15) *I called my lawyer and she said that...*

The semantic representation would present the configuration referring to 'speaker's female lawyer' as entering a semantic relation with both the sense of 'call' and the sense of 'say'. Nevertheless, the choice of encoding this configuration as a noun modified by a possessive adjective, in the first clause, and as a pronoun in the second clause is due to the fact linear order of the two instances. Should our speaker decide to encode the meaning differently slightly, the eventual sentence would be:

(2.16) *My lawyer said, when I called her, that..*

but not:

(2.17) *She said, when I called my lawyer, that...*

Because (2.17) would refer to a situation when *she* is not co-referential with *my lawyer*.

The co-reference between nouns and pronouns is not that straightforward and does not rely on linear order alone, since one can say in English

(2.18) *When I called her, my lawyer said that...*

However, the sentence would be ambiguous and may be equivalent either to (2.16) or to (2.17).

The actual encoding of some configurations as personal or reflexive pronouns not according to linear order but to other issues, as it would be in the case of (2.18) used with the meaning of (2.16) (i.e. the co-referentiality) is language specific. While English in some cases allows it, Polish does not, as can be seen in 2.19, which is a direct translation of (2.17) and not of (2.16), as shown by indexes provided:

(2.19) *Zadzwońełm do niej₁ i moja prawniczka₂ powiedziała, że...*
'I called her₁ and my female lawyer₂ said that...'

¹⁶ The idea of 'waiting' invoked here is not in any sense similar to Procrastination of the Minimalist Program, since within Encoding Grammar there is no distinction between overt and covert syntax.

Among numerous possible examples I will give just three: In English (2.20a) is appropriate if the meaning to be encoded is that John's wife told him that she wanted a divorce

(2.20a) *His wife told John that she wanted a divorce.*

However, its word-for word translation into Polish presented as (2.20b) means that somebody else's wife informed John of her intention do divorce her husband, who is not John, as again shown by indexes provided

(2.20b) *Jego₁ żona₂ powiedziała Janowi₃, że Ø₂ chce rozwodu.*
His₁ wife₂ told John₃ that [she]₂ wanted a divorce

Reflexives are even more complicated, since in Polish the reflexive pronoun *swój* which is not marked for person, number nor gender of the possessor, can (and to avoid ambiguity should) be used as co-referential to grammatical subject, as shown in (2.21a, b)

- (2.21a) *Ø₁ Powiedział ojcu₂, że Ø₁ zepsuł swój₁ zegarek.*
'He₁ told [his] father₂ that he₁ had broken his₁ watch.'
(2.21b) *Ø₁ Powiedział ojcu₂, że Ø₁ zepsuł jego₂ zegarek.*
'He₁ told [his] father₂ that he₁ had broken his₂ watch.'

In this case the linear order is not decisive, as shown in (2.22)

- (2.22) *Ojcu₂ Ø₁ powiedział, że Ø₁ zepsuł swój₁/jego₂ zegarek.*
'To father₂ [he₁] told that [he₁] had broken his_{1/2} watch.'


However, the subjecthood of the clause containing the reflexive is, as shown in (2.23a, b) – (2.25a, b)

- (2.23a) *Ojciec₁ zepsuł swój₁ zegarek.*
The father₁ broke his watch his₁ watch.'
(2.23b) *Ojciec₁ zepsuł jego_n zegarek.*
The father₁ broke his watch his_n watch.'
(2.24a) *Ojciec₁ dowiedział się, że Ø₁ zepsuł swój₁ zegarek.*
The father₁ learned that [he₁] had broken his_n watch.'
(2.24b) *Ojciec₁ dowiedział się, że Ø₁ zepsuł jego_n zegarek.*
The father₁ learned that [he₁] had broken his_n watch.'
(2.25a) *Ojciec₁ dowiedział się, że syn₂ zepsuł swój₂ zegarek.*
The father₁ learned that the son₂ had broken his₂ watch.'
(2.25b) *Ojciec₁ dowiedział się, że syn₂ zepsuł jego₁ zegarek.*
The father₁ learned the son₂ had broken his watch his₂ watch.'

It is fairly clear that the encoding procedures behind the examples (2.3a, b), (2.4a, b), (2.5a, b), (2.6a, b) and (2.7) from the previous section and the examples (2.13) and (2.14) in this section is somehow different from those invoked to deal with examples (2.15) – (2.25a, b) in this section. While the former are concerned with matching configurations of meaning with appropriate lexical units (by their signifieds and syntactic requirements) and transforming semantic relations into syntactic ones, and may not be directly reflected in the eventual final

form of the sentence, the latter is reasonably lexicon-independent and is concerned with the final, i.e. surface form of the encoded sentence. It should be obvious now that the stratificational character of the Encoding Grammar should be extended to include not one level of syntax, but two: a deep-syntactic level and a surface-syntactic level. By the same token the syntactic module should consist of two submodules: a deep-syntactic and a surface syntactic one. The cut-off point between the two and how they are connected underlies the remarks illustrated by the examples (2.3a, b) – (2.8a, b) in the previous section, and will be illustrated in some detail below.

The choice of the noun (*singer*) and the nominal predicate configuration, as done for English in (2.3a) occurred at the deep-syntactic level. Similarly, the choice of the verb ‘to sing’ in Polish, German and Spanish occurred at the same level of the encoding process in Polish, Spanish, and German respectively. Thus in these languages the appropriate deep syntactic forms obtained were those in (2.26)¹⁷, presented here as a dependency tree, in the Meaning ⇔ Text Model style, although with the theme-rheme division shown.¹⁸:



Such encoding was “allowed” and appropriate because it would not interfere with encoding the verb as theme further on, since in both languages in such cases the verb simply precedes its subject. Thus the deep-syntactic module “peeked” into the surface-syntactic one and checked that the theme-rheme division can be encoded there. By contrast, the deep-syntactic module for English “knew” that if it encodes the singing as a verb there is no way to encode it as theme further on, thus it opted for the noun. This personalizing of the module is only mildly metaphoric since the module is supposed to reflect the speaker’s activity at encoding.

The MC example helps to explain that Encoding Grammar allows looking ahead and checking possibilities available at subsequent stages, such as offered by voice, linearization, intonation etc. By contrast, it does not allow for looking back: whatever is deleted or suppressed by the deep-syntactic level, is forever lost. That is why the deep-syntactic level of the Encoding Grammar presents the division into theme and rheme, because all components of meaning unencoded and unsuppressed at a deeper level are passed up to a subsequent, i.e. closer-to-surface level.

¹⁷ With the German example left out, because we would have to account for the appearance of *es* on the surface, which would complicate the picture at this stage.

¹⁸ Overall differences between the Encoding Grammar and the Meaning ⇔ Text Model will be discussed in the following section. Here suffice it to say that their syntactic dependency trees usually do not show the themes and rhemes, since the division into them does not result in separate subtrees. Moreover, while within the Meaning ⇔ Text Model both deep and surface syntax is described in terms of dependencies the Encoding Grammar describes only deep syntax in terms of dependencies and the surface syntax, at least for so-called configurational languages, in terms of constituency. The reasons will be explained in Chapter V: *Encoding Grammar and Syntax*.

Similarly, in the situations referred to in examples (2.4a, b) – (2.8a, b) the Encoding Grammar of English allows the choice of the verbs *to tell* and *to give* because the surface syntax module can use the appropriate passive construction, which is not available in Polish or Spanish. Thus when encoding in Polish or Spanish, a verb showing different diathetic features is chosen if the eventual sentence should be made fairly unmarked, or the verbs meaning ‘tell’ and ‘give’ are chosen and the division into theme and rheme is encoded at the linearization level. In Polish this is straightforward enough and involves only changes of word order, as can be seen in (2.8b), while in Spanish the insertion of pleonastic clitic pronouns will be necessary, as can be seen in (2.8a). The instances mentioned so far do not exhaust all that is done by each of the two syntactic modules,

Once the encoding has reached the linearization stage and the sentence-to-be has all the syntactic elements in appropriate slots, the morphological level is activated. The morphological module does several things: first of all it can still encode some parts of meanings that have been passed over at syntax, for example number, tense, mood, etc. whenever they are independent, i.e. purely semantic based categories. A less straightforward example is provided by Polish where the partitive sense can be encoded on the direct object through the insertion of genitive and not accusative, if the verb allows it, as in (2.27a, b)

- (2.27a) *Zjadł zupę.* (accusative)
 ‘He ate [the] soup’.
- (2.27b) *Zjadł zupy.* (genitive)
 He ate some (of the) soup’

In the same way it encodes, in some languages, semantic relations on predicatives, as in the Russian example (2.2), used and discussed in the previous section. Similar examples can be made up for Polish and Romance languages among others.

Then, it introduces all the morphological dependencies corresponding to syntactic dependencies, i.e. morphological agreement, morphological government, and so on. For example it would introduce the instrumental marker (but not number and gender, since these are semantic in nature) on ‘young’ in (2.2) and its Polish counterpart.

Finally, all the lexical units, including function words, and grammatical morphemes are given their morphophonological representations, i.e. their signifiers. It is done so late during the encoding process to account for morphophonologic adjustments of adjacent words, and not only morphological alternations within words. For example in Portuguese, the actual phonological string corresponding to a verbal word form in some instances depends on the clitic attached to that form. An is provided in (2.28):

- (2.28) *Agarraram-na conseguindo, a muito custo arrastá-la do quarto.*
 ‘They grabbed her, managing at a great cost, to pull her out of the room’ [Cunha, Cintra 1985: 301]

where the form *arrastá-la* represents the infinitive *arrastar* and the feminine singular accusative clitic *a*. Other examples could include Portuguese fused forms of prepositions and articles, i.e. *à* corresponding to the preposition *a* and the feminine article *a*; *pelo/pela* corresponding to the preposition *per* and the feminine or masculine article *o/a* respectively. Another Portuguese example is that of merging of dative and third person accusative clitic pronouns, which is quite common, since the accusative pronouns bear marks of the gender of the noun they substitute, as can be seen in the following series of examples, taken from a Web

page dedicated to Portuguese grammar¹⁹; the examples concerns the form in which the accusative *as* (referring to *flores* ‘flowers’) combine with pronouns referring to recipients:

- (2.29) *Ele ofereceu-me flores ontem.*
 ‘He gave-me flowers yesterday.’
Ele ofereceu-mas ontem.
 ‘He gave-me+them yesterday.’
Eu ofereci-te flores ontem.
 ‘I gave-you(sg) flowers yesterday.’
Eu ofereci-tas ontem.
 ‘I gave-you(sg)+them yesterday.’
Eu ofereci flores à Joana ontem.
 ‘I gave flowers to Joana yesterday.’
Eu ofereci-lhas ontem.
 ‘I gave-her+them- yesterday.’
Ele ofereceu-nos flores ontem.
 ‘He gave-us flowers yesterday.’
Ele ofereceu-no-las ontem.
 He gave-us+them yesterday.’
Eu ofereci-vos flores ontem.
 ‘I gave-you(pl) flowers yesterday.’
Eu ofereci-vo-las ontem.
 ‘I gave-you(pl)+them yesterday.’
Eu ofereci flores às minhas primas ontem.
 ‘I gave flowers to my nieces yesterday.’
Eu ofereci-lhas ontem .
 ‘I gave-them+them yesterday.’

Something similar occurs in Spanish, where the dative pronoun, both in singular and plural (in other contexts *le, les*) appears as *se* in front of accusative pronouns *lo(s)/la(s)*.

- (2.30) *Dale flores a tu madre.*
 ‘Give-her flowers to your mother.’
Dáselas a tu madre.
 ‘Give-her-them (fem) to your mother’.

In all, it could be said, not surprisingly, that in broad terms, the deep syntactic submodule of the Encoding Grammar interfaces mainly with semantics, while the surface syntactic submodule interfaces mainly with morphology. Nevertheless, the surface syntactic submodule, and even the morphophonological module are not entirely devoid of semantics. Both syntactic module and the morphophonological modules of Encoding Grammar are fairly language specific.

The rough outline of the Encoding Grammar can be thus presented in Figure 1.

¹⁹ <http://www.ciberduvidas.com/pergunta.php?id=21371> (2011.12.03).




Figure 1: The architecture of the Encoding Grammar

2.3. The Encoding Grammar and The Meaning↔Text Model

As could be seen in the previous chapter and in the two previous sections of this chapter the Encoding Grammar draws heavily on the Meaning↔Text Model. All the departures from it have arisen due to the fact that the kind of speaker's perspective necessary to account for conflicts and compromises could not be introduced in the MTM framework without turning it to what it is not.

Importantly, the MTM model *is* a complete model of language, elaborated in detail and highly formalized. At present the Encoding Grammar is just a rough sketch of what a different model of language could be. However, it is assumed that many of the features of the Encoding Grammar could be described in a way similar to MTM. Whenever that is possible, MTM-like solutions are adopted, as for example in (2.26) in the previous section.

Even though, the differences are many. First of all the Encoding Grammar is not a device that accounts for the fact that a single meaning can be represented by or mapped to several texts, which is the basic tenet of the MTM model. The other important feature of the MTM is that a single text can be mapped to several meanings (cf. [Mel'čuk 1988: 46] quoted in the previous chapter). The fact that an actual text can have different meanings is a serious challenge to the Encoding Grammar and it meets it by saying that among many possible decoding of a sentence or utterance only one is valid: the one that is identical with its semantic representation (or structure in MTM terms). While the MTM is in fact bidirectional [Mel'čuk 1988: 46], the Encoding Grammar is not and insists on decoding not being seen as encoding in reverse.

The second important difference concerns the availability of different representations within each of the framework. Mel'čuk [1988: 49] writes:

In the Meaning ↔Text approach, then, an utterance is simultaneously characterized by seven different representations [Semantic, Deep-Syntactic, Surface-Syntactic, Deep-Morphological, Surface Morphological, Deep-Phonetic, Surface-Phonetic] each of these specifying the utterance in the perspective in of the corresponding level [...] Let it be emphasized that any representation carries ALL the information contained in the utterance considered; all the seven MTM representations encode the SAME informational content, but by means of different units and different sets of relations. Any two MTM representations differ than only in that one presents more explicitly and makes more available different properties of the utterance than the other [...]
Notice that, consequently, a representation of level n preserves all the linguistic₁ information available at a more surface level $n+1$; therefore as we go from level $n+1$ to a deeper level n linguistic₁ ambiguity may only decrease. [...]

By contrast, Encoding Grammar states explicitly that what corresponds to Mel'čuk's "linguistic₁ information" once satisfactory encoded at one level, by appropriate module, becomes available to subsequent modules in the restricted way: subsequent modules can only either re-encode in a different way or encode what has been passed over a previous stage. For example, the surface-syntactic module is not concerned with lexical meanings or actant roles and cannot alter them. On the other hand it can encode deep-syntactic relations as surface-syntactic relations, as must have happened in (2.5a, b), where the first actants of the Spanish verbs *saber* 'to know' and *recibir* 'to receive' were encoded as surface subjects. By contrast, to obtain (2.4 a, b) the surface syntactic module encoded, through passivisation, the fact that the person who learned something or received something was presented in the semantic representation as theme. (Within the Encoding Grammar in cases like (2.5a, b) the need to encode the thematic character of the appropriate participant is fulfilled by making it the first

actant on the deep-syntactic level, as will be shown in Chapter V: *The Encoding Grammar and Syntax*.) Thus the Encoding Grammar is dynamic, while the MTM model is static:

[t]he MTM rules have to important properties: First, as I have already said, these rules are static, not dynamic. They simply state what corresponds to what, they do not transform or generate anything. When, for instance the transition from a given SemR ‘X’ to a corresponding DSyntRel Y takes place, the rules of the Semantic Components do not change ‘X’ In the least. With ‘X’ used as blueprint, these rules are applied to construct Y by a dynamic mechanism, which is not part of the MTM, because it is deemed not to be linguistic₁ in nature. [Mel’čuk 1988: 72]

Though it is sometimes presented in such way as if it was not, as can be seen in the following quote from Kahane, Mel’čuk 1999: 45-46]:

Le sous-module sémantique de correspondance d'un modèle Sens-Texte doit traiter de toutes les structures composant la représentation sémantique (SSém et SComm-Sém) et de toutes les structures composant la représentation syntaxique profonde (structure SyntP, structure communicative SyntP, structure anaphorique SyntP et structure prosodique SyntP). L'interaction entre ces différentes structures rend le passage entre les deux représentations en question assez complexe. [...] On peut comparer le passage “SSém+SComm-Sém => SSyntP” à la traduction mot à mot d'un texte d'une langue L1 dans une langue L2 à l'aide d'un dictionnaire bilingue L1 => L2.[...] Mais malgré sa plus grande complexité, la nature logique de la procédure Rsém=>SSyntP reste la même que celle d'une traduction mot à mot” [emphasis mine]

In particular the semantic representation within the Encoding Grammar does not exactly correspond to MTM’s syntactic representation (see previous section). It contains the entire MTM’s semantic structure and only the division between themes and rhemes from the Semantic Communicative Structure (“SComm-Sém” in the quote above). The semantic structure of the Encoding Grammar corresponds only very roughly to MTM’s lexicon, insofar that both contain lexical units available in a given language. However, the Encoding Grammar’s Deep Syntactic Module simply matches configurations of meaning with signifiers and does not offer possibilities of paraphrasing. In MTM’s terms there are no Lexical Functions provided within the Encoding Grammar and by the same token there is no *Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary* of a given language [Mel’čuk 2004a: 3-4].

The differences mentioned here can be illustrated with the use of examples quoted in Mel’čuk 2004b: 252]. While MTM is concerned with the equivalences:

- (2.31a) *X is plagued by doubt* ≡ *X feels gnawing doubt* (2.31a’)
- (2.31b) *X spares no effort* ≡ *X makes huge efforts* (2.31b’)
- (2.31c) *X flashes a smile at Y* ≡ *X gives Y a (big/dazzling) smile* (2.31c’)
- (2.31d) *X heaps praise on Y* ≡ *X sings high praise of Y (to Z)* (2.31d’)

the Encoding Grammar would deal with either choosing the verb *to plague* with its syntactic pattern for (2.31a), or the verb *to feel* with its syntactic pattern for (2.31a’), etc. and with the

respective choices involved in encoding each of the meanings in either of the ways. Thus the Encoding Grammar will not be concerned with the synonymy between the respective pairs of sentences.

A crucial difference between the two frameworks lies in the fact that the MTM uses semantemes in its presentation of the meaning and the Encoding Grammar would not. The MTM semantemes are senses of words of a particular language (see for example Mel'čuk 2004a: 25]), thus they correspond roughly to the signifieds of lexical units that appear in encoding and not in the encoded meaning.²⁰

Some of the differences between the Encoding Grammar and the MTM arise from the fact that the division into themes and rhemes is central to the Encoding Grammar, while not that much in the MTM model. For example, while the Encoding Grammar follows the MTM in its account of the deep-syntactic configurations (called structures in MTM and representations in the Encoding Grammar) and uses actants ranking and numbering to account for passages from semantic roles into surface subjects, objects and circumstantial, it does not define the deep-syntactic actants in terms of their surface correspondents (as Mel'čuk [2004b: 252-257] is doing, but in terms of their certain properties related to the division between themes and rhemes.²¹

As far as syntax is concerned, the Encoding Grammar follows the MTM insofar that it contains both a deep syntactic level and a surface syntactic level. However, while syntactic relations at the deep syntactic level of the Encoding Grammar are represented as dependencies, the surface syntactic relations may be represented as constitutencies (cf. note 18 in the previous section).

Finally, at the present stage the Encoding Grammar does not provide a description of morphology, unless to illustrate some particular ways of encoding semantic information.

2.4. The Encoding Grammar and The Functional Discourse Grammar

The Encoding Grammar resembles the Functional Discourse Grammar inasmuch that it adopts explicitly and exclusively the encoding perspective and the production of utterances [Hegenveld, Mackenzie 2008: 1]. However, within the same paragraph the authors state:

This does not mean that FDG is a model of a speaker: FDG is a theory about grammar [emphasis mine], but one that tries to reflect psycholinguistic evidence in its basic architecture”.

By contrast, the Encoding Grammar tries to be an idealized model of a speaker's activity that does not opt for providing psycholinguistic evidence for its assumptions. Moreover, as it has already been mentioned in the previous section, the Encoding Grammar claims that the encoding cannot be turned into decoding by reversing, while the Functional Discourse Grammar states it “could in principle be turned on its head to account for the parsing of utterances”. [Hegenveld, Mackenzie 2008: 2]. Moreover, the Functional Discourse Grammar

²⁰ This will be treated in more detail in Chapter III: *The Encoding Grammar and Semantics*

²¹ This has been already mentioned in this section when comparing (2.4a, b) with (2.5a, b) and will be further elaborated in Chapter IV: *The Encoding Grammar And The Theme-Rheme Divisions. The Encoding Grammar and Syntax* and in Chapter V: *The Encoding Grammar and Syntax*.

is “a pattern model that is inspired by process without seeking to model the latter” [Hegenveld, Mackenzie 2008: 24], while the Encoding Grammar would be described in these terms exactly as a process model. Patterns referred to by Hegenveld and Mackenzie, as well as Frames, i.e. their representations within the model, correspond roughly to configurations in language structure within the Encoding Grammar.

At the same time, the Functional Discourse Grammar is concerned with the speaker’s intention [Hegenveld, Mackenzie 2008:1] and the “communicative effect upon the Addressee” [Hegenveld, Mackenzie 2008:37], while the Encoding Grammar is not, as it has been said in the first section of this chapter.

Similarly to Functional Discourse Grammar the Encoding Grammar assumes that speakers produce texts “larger than the individual clause” [Hegenveld, Mackenzie 2008: 3]. However, in contrast to FDG the Encoding Grammar models the production of single sentences, while postulating that the speaker’s strategies for encoding a particular meaning, and specifically not encoding it and leaving it for the addressee to deduce, may be related to other sentences in the discourse. Nevertheless, the Encoding Grammar is a grammar of sentences and not a discourse grammar.

Another important difference concerns the degree to which pragmatics is represented in the two accounts. The Encoding Grammar invokes pragmatics, or the relation between the speaker and the addressee, rather sparsely: to define theme and rheme and to account for grammatically encoded status relations (i.e. grammaticalized honorifics, but not the choice of register [cf. Huszcza 2006: 154]).

Finally, in terms of its architecture the Encoding Grammar is not parallel to the Functional Discourse Grammar: it has no separate Interpersonal Level for pragmatics, neither semantic representation nor semantic structure is representational in nature (i.e. it does not concern itself with state of affairs as such) and instead of a single morphosyntactical level postulates two syntactic levels. Likewise, the Encoding Grammar does not divide the production of utterances into formulation and encoding, as the Functional Discourse Grammar does:

Two major operations have to be distinguished in the top-down construction of utterance: FORMULATION and ENCODING. Formulation concerns the rules that determine what constitute valid underlying pragmatic and semantic representations in the language. Encoding concerns the rules that convert these pragmatic and semantic representations into morphosyntactic and phonological ones. The operation of formulation involves three interlinked processes: the selection of appropriate frames of the Interpersonal and Representative Levels; the insertion of appropriate lexemes into these frames; and the application of operators symbolizing the grammatical distinctions required in the language under analysis. Encoding also involves three processes: the selection of appropriate templates for the Morphosyntactic and Phonological Levels; the insertion of free and bound grammatical morphemes; and application of operators that play a role in the process of articulating the output of the grammar” [Hegenveld, Mackenzie 2008: 1-2]

In the Encoding Grammar the insertion of lexemes (or rather of their signifiers) is a part of the encoding process, together with the choice of available syntactic relations between them, and during the encoding process the semantic structure of the language determines what can and what cannot be encoded, thus it is not the speaker, but the language itself that decides which “underlying pragmatic and semantic representations” are valid, i.e. encodable within this language.