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I

Why The Encoding Perspective

The idea of presenting language within an explicitly encoding perspective has evolved as a result of a search for some consistency when talking about language. When I first realized that some phenomena could be explained by interaction of semantics, syntax and information structure as either the conflict or the compromise or the collaboration between them, I was mainly concerned with defining the information structure adequately to my purpose, while assuming that syntax and semantics were self-evident or rather, any dependency-syntactic and any semantic account would do¹. However, I was painfully aware that linguistic theory was not altogether unanimous as to what constitutes the information structure and how it should be presented or accounted for. Upon examining various proposals in order to choose one that would be best suited to my purpose I realized that some of the misunderstandings and debates concerning the issue arise from some of the scholars adopting, explicitly or implicitly, the speaker's perspective and defining the relevant notions (theme or topic; rheme or comment), in terms of what the speaker is trying to achieve, while others presented them as a feature of the utterance's syntactic structure and/or semantics [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2008a].² Moreover, since it may seem at the first glance that all accounts deal with the same phenomenon, but within different frameworks, the debates are deemed to continue with little chance of reaching a satisfying consensus.. In the same text I stated explicitly that in works of different scholars the term *theme* (or *topic*) was applied to different facets of language or utterances and proposed to adopt an explicitly speaker oriented account of information structure.

Upon deciding what the information structure was going to be for the purpose of discussing its role in the conflicts and compromises, the next obvious step was to see its place in relation to semantics and syntax. For reasons I explained partly elsewhere [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2008b] and will develop later on, I opted for considering the information structure as a part of meaning, or more specifically, of roughly equating this structure with the division of meaning into its rhematic and the thematic elements³; the division itself being expressed by syntactic and morphological means of the language. For reasons of consistency I had to decide at this stage that if syntax was to be understood as a means of marking, among other things, the information structure, the speaker's perspective had to be adopted for syntax as well.

¹ I assumed at that stage that it was possible to follow roughly the Meaning \leftrightarrow Text Model. It was later that I realized that the encoding perspective it takes (cf. Mel'čuk [1988: 46] quoted further on cannot be equated with the framework I needed. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter II. *The Encoding Perspective Embodied: The Encoding Grammar*.

² My understanding of information structure, and how it interacts with semantics and syntax is presented in Chapter IV. *The Encoding Grammar And Theme-Rheme-Division*.

³ See note 1.

Other reasons soon became apparent. If the main purpose of the book is to show that various observable surface phenomena can be described as a result of conflicts and compromises between semantics and syntax, the underlying idea must be that there is some entity that in some sense is aware of the conflicts and resolves them, possibly through some compromises. It is possible to imagine that this entity is the language itself, as it is proposed within the Optimality Theory. Linguists do talk of strategies adopted by particular languages, both within typology and within the theory of language. But this is just a metaphor: actually languages are the way they are; the strategies actually lie within the scope of the language use. As many a contrastive linguist knows, different languages simply possess different means (words of different meanings, grammatical morphemes, and syntactic patterns) that are used by people to express their ideas, and once used, are analyzed by other people to understand what is being said.

In contemporary linguistics it is common to either concentrate on the language itself or on language use. The latter has mainly been the object of pragmatics, however, as Sperber and Wilson [1986] have rightly shown, communication with the use of language has to rely, at least partly, on decoding linguistic meaning⁴. The distinction between language itself and communication through language has been, however, paramount for many theoretical frameworks.

It is not surprising that the preponderance of interest in language itself was accompanied by backgrounding of the encoding perspective, or at least presenting language as something that may and should be separated from language use. A classic example is the famous “*langue*” vs. “*parole*” distinction de Saussure’s [1972 : 25]⁵ :

Mais qu’est-ce que la langue? Pour nous elle ne se confond pas avec le langage; elle n’en est qu’une part déterminée, essentielle, il est vrai. C’est à la fois un produit social de la faculté du langage et un ensemble de conventions nécessaires, adoptées par le corps social pour permettre l’exercice de cette faculté chez les individus.

By contrast:

La parole est au contraire un acte individuel de volonté et d’intelligence, dans lequel il convient de distinguer : 1° les combinaisons par lesquelles le sujet parlant utilise le code de la langue en vue d’exprimer sa pensée personnelle ; 2° le mécanisme psychophysique qui lui permet d’extérioriser ces combinaisons. [de Saussure 1972 : 31]

The separation of language itself from all its manifestations is even more clear in Hjelmslev [1942], particularly when he closely examines the notion of *langue*. According to him, *langue* can be considered:

- a. comme une *forme pure*, définie indépendamment de sa réalisation sociale et de sa manifestation matérielle [i.e. schema] ;
- b. comme une *forme matérielle*, définie par une réalisation sociale donnée mais indépendamment encore du détail de la manifestation [i.e. norme] ;
- c. comme un simple *ensemble des habitudes* adoptées dans une société donnée, et définies par les manifestations observées. [i.e. usage]

⁴ As it is widely known, Grice’s [1957] initial account of meaning of utterances in terms of speaker’s intention has been utterly ridiculed by Ziff [1967].

⁵ I am perfectly aware of the fact that with the publication of [de Saussure 2002] some ideas known to the linguistic community through various editions of *Cours de linguistique générale* can no longer be attributed to de Saussure himself. Nevertheless, it is the *Cours* and not the *Écrits* that have been the basis of structuralism and have been amply discussed in 20th century linguistic literature.

Indeed, in the sense of *schema* and *norme* the language (*langue*) could be studied independently of all manifestations, and only *usage* refers to actual language production, but should be understood as the body of produced texts, and not as an activity..

However Hjelmslev concludes:

D'autre part, cette idée du *schéma*, bien que nettement prédominante dans la conception saussurienne, n'en est pas le seul facteur constitutif. L'«image acoustique» dont il est parlé à maint endroit du *Cours* ne saurait être que la traduction psychique d'un fait matériel ; elle attache donc la langue à une matière donnée et l'assimile à la *norme*. Il est dit en outre que la langue est l'ensemble des habitudes linguistiques; la langue ne serait donc rien qu'un usage http://www.revue-texto.net/1996-2007/Saussure/Sur_Saussure/Hjelmslev_Langue.html - [sdfootnote20sym](#). Il paraît, somme toute, que la définition de la langue n'est ni dans l'une ni dans l'autre des trois acceptions que nous avons distinguées, et que la seule définition universellement applicable consiste à déterminer la langue, dans l'acception saussurienne, comme un *système de signes*. Cette définition générale admet de nombreuses nuances dont le maître de Genève a pu avoir pleinement conscience mais sur lesquelles il n'a pas jugé utile d'insister ; les motifs qui ont pu déterminer cette attitude nous échappent naturellement.

The absence of the notion of encoding in *langue* is further confirmed by another statement:

Le rôle caractéristique de la langue vis-à-vis de la pensée n'est pas de créer un moyen phonique matériel pour l'expressions des idées, mais de servir d'intermédiaire entre la pensée et le son, dans des conditions telles que leur union aboutit nécessairement à des délimitations réciproques d'unités [de Saussure 1972 : 157]

The relegation of encoding to *parole* is one of the reasons why within *Cours* sometimes syntax seems to belong to *parole* and sometimes to *langue*, as was rightly noted by the editors [de Saussure 1972: 468 (note 251)].

The encoding perspective is similarly absent in the Copenhagen School, which can be easily seen in the entire model presented in Hjelmslev [1961]. The very idea of the two planes (of content and of expression), and in particular the commutation test that separates the substance from the form of the two planes are meant to show that linguistic analysis should not concern itself with linguistic activity of text production (though it should concern itself with text analysis). Within the American Structuralism the ban on encoding perspective lies in the very core of the methodology and can be seen in text written within this methodology.

It is noteworthy that the distinction between the encoding and decoding perspective has been explicitly postulated by Jakobson [1971], but in this text it is restricted to descriptive linguistics and not linguistic theory itself. Other linguists, both from the Prague School, and outside, have postulated studies in “linguistics of speaking”, for example Coşeriu, following some ideas of Humboldt and Bühler, proposes *linguistica de hablar*. [Coşeriu 1967: 91-94; 1981: 271-275]. Nevertheless, from the way these proposals were formulated it is difficult to decide if what was meant was just the linguistics of *parole* (as opposed to linguistics of *langue*) or a linguistics of *parole* carried out from truly encoding perspective, i.e. as the actual production of utterances.

Contrary to some early misconceptions, generative approaches to grammar eschew the actual encoding. The misunderstanding may be due to the way the generative grammar was first presented. First of all it appeared to be highly dynamic, with its re-writing rules and transformation rules that changed something into something else. Secondly, it was a model

and not a description. Moreover the distinction between performance and competence was understood as if the first referred to actual language production and the second to the idealized production. Nevertheless, while performance may be similar to actual language production, the competence is not. However, the dynamic character of the generative grammar gave rise to equating process with production, as can be seen in some eminent linguists' commentaries:

[...] Chomsky is quite correct when he writes that his conception of the concern of linguistic theory seems to have been also the position of the founders of modern general linguistics. Certainly, if modern structural linguistics is meant, then a major thrust of it has been to define the subject matter of linguistic theory in terms of what it is not. In de Saussure's linguistics, as generally interpreted, *la langue* was the privileged ground of structure and *la parole* the residual realm of variation (among other things). Chomsky associates his views of competence and performance with the Saussurian conceptions of *langue* and *parole*, but he sees his own conceptions as superior, going beyond the conception of language as a systematic inventory of items, to renewal of the Humboldtian conception of underlying processes [Hymes 2001:56]

It would nevertheless be contrary to common sense to posit that the sentence derivation rules, that eventually give both phonetic and semantic representations as some kind of outcome, represent any kind of speakers' activity. Generative grammar represent formally a static "knowledge" of the speakers. This is even more clear if one examines the way the Minimalist Program is presented. The grammar states that the derivation starts with the Numeration during which lexical items are drawn from the Lexicon and then are connected through the Move and Merge Operations till the Spell-Out stage is reached. At this stage the phonological features are sent to the Phonological Component where the Phonological Form is produced, while the covert part of the derivation continues and finally the semantic features get their representation in the Semantic Component as the Logical Form. If one took this to represent the actual production of utterances it would mean one of the two things, equally implausible. One is that the speaker selects haphazardly some lexical items, and let the derivation happen without having any control over it (since it is controlled by the necessity to check features of the items selected and nothing else), and waits to see what comes out, i.e. what Phonological Form obtains and with what associated meaning. And that happens only if the speaker is lucky and the derivation does not crash, which it would if the lexical items cannot be made up into a sentence. That would mean that the speaker has no control over what the utterance is going to be. The other way of interpreting the Minimalist Program and the derivation as a production model would be to posit that speakers choose the items at Numeration to make up the appropriate sentence. This would mean that already at the Numeration stage they have in mind a blueprint of all the derivational processes involved and triggered by the features of the selected elements, and by the same token they have a blueprint of the outcome of the derivation. This maybe more plausible, but that means again that the model is the model of knowledge behind the process and not of the process itself. Obviously, what the Minimalist Program says is: A given set of lexical units of a given language is used to form such and such sentences which have such and such Phonetic Form and this Logical Form and the speaker has little say in the matter.

Nevertheless, some statements by Chomsky himself seem to favor the speaker's perspective:

[...] language is not properly regarded as system of communication. It is a system for expressing thought, something quite different. It can of course be used for communication, as can anything people do – manner of walking, or style of clothes, or hair, for example. But in any useful sense of

the term, communication is not *the* [original emphasis] function of language, and may even be of no unique significance for understanding the functions and nature of language” [Chomsky, Belletti, Rizzi 2002: 76]

However, it does not invalidate my way of seeing the Minimalist program as not being a model of production, because the thought to be expressed is not the same as the Logical Form of the sentence, but a part of Conceptual-Intentional System which remains outside of the scope of the language itself. Moreover, since the Logical Form interfaces with the Conceptual-Intentional System and the Sensory Motor System interfaces with the Phonological Form the language (or the language faculty, at least in the broad sense) has to account both for expressing thoughts (i.e. converting some contents of Conceptual-Intentional System into something accessible to the Sensory Motor System, i.e. something sayable, writable or signable, and for the reverse process, i.e. the perception of an utterance (phonic, graphic or signed) and connecting it (through grammar) to an appropriate Logical Form and consequently to the Conceptual-Intentional System.

Nevertheless the term *generative* is sometimes applied in the sense ‘encoding oriented’ or even ‘referring to production’. I believe that this is the sense in which it appears in the name of the Functional Generative Grammar. Lopatková, Plátek and Sgall in the abstract of their paper write:

Functional Generative Description (FGD) is a dependency based descriptive system, which has been in development since the 1960s, see esp. Sgall et al. (1969). FGD was originally implemented as a generative procedure, but lately we have been interested in a declarative representation. [Lopatková, Plátek, Sgall 2007: 7]

A similar sense of the term *generation* can be inferred from initial statement describing another linguistic model:

“Note that, although the presentation of the FDG [Functional Discourse Grammar] model will focus on the generation [emphasis mine] of utterances, the model could in principle be turned on its head to account for the parsing of utterances. It is clear that listeners analyse phonetic input into phonological representations, which are subsequently grouped into morphosyntactic constituents, from which meaningful representation are then construed” [Hengeveld, Mackenzie 2008: 2]

This elusive presence of the encoding perspective in many linguistic theories may be rooted in the ambiguity of the term *Speaker* itself. The word can be used to refer to the actual utterer, as it is for example rigorously done by Sperber and Wilson [1986], or in other works in pragmatics, and, obviously, in the classic contrast between the *Speaker* and the *Hearer*. However, it can also be used with reference to the language user, as in *a native speaker*.⁶ In some cases the context, which makes explicit reference to the encoding process, may clarify the sense, but in others it may lead to misunderstanding. The issue may be illustrated by the distinction made by Fillmore [1985: 232ff] between frames evoked by words and frames invoked by the speakers. The latter are illustrated with the famous example

(1.1) *We never open our presents before morning.*

⁶ In Polish in the first sense the appropriate word is *nadawca* ‘utterer’ while in the second a phrase *użytkownik języka* ‘lit. language user’ is used.

which evidently refers to Christmas presents, although the word *Christmas* does not appear in the utterance and in Fillmore's terms the Christmas frame is invoked by the speakers. The question remains whether *speakers* should be taken to refer to those who would produce the utterance or those who are likely to understand it. Since the entire theory presented in Fillmore [1985] deals with understanding of utterances it is far more likely that the terms should be understood as referring to speakers-as-language users, particularly in the light of Fillmore's statement that he is not yet compelled to consider semantic as part of production of language⁷.

Explicit mention of both the encoding perspective and the speaker as utterer is made in the Meaning ⇔ Text Model. Even more, it is one of the basic tenets of the model:

In the MTM, the mapping {SemR_i} ⇔ {PhonR_j} is bidirectional: it represents the production of speech (from meaning to texts) as well as the understanding of speech (from text to meanings) Logically, both directions are, of course, equivalent, But linguistically₁ they are not: language gives a more prominent place to the speaker than to the addressee. A speaker is possible even in the absence of an addressee (one can speak to oneself, to God,..., to the posteriority, etc.) while an addressee is inconceivable without the speaker. In all language we say *Do you speak ...?* And this is a typical cliché; in all languages there is a special verb to refer to the production of speech—*speak*—but there seems to be none that refers exclusively to the understanding of speech (you can *understand* anything, not just speech). In an idealized situation of linguistic₁ communication, the speaker knows what he is going to say: he proceeds from complete information, and his only task is to use his linguistic₁ skills properly; whereas the addressee does not know anything beforehand, and has to decipher the utterance, actively using his logic, his extralinguistic knowledge, etc.

Therefore, first, purely linguistic₁ skills are not as important to the addressee as to the speaker, and second, the addressee never uses them alone, in pure form. For this reason the viewpoint of the speaker is more advantageous for linguistics: it allows one to avoid confusion with non-linguistic₁ data and ensures a correct perspective" [Mel'čuk 1988: 46]

It is important to note that giving priority to encoding perspective, argued in the quote, does not mean that the model itself is the model of production. As can be seen, the main purpose of the MTM is to map meanings (or more precisely linguistic₁ meanings⁸) into appropriate phonetic representations. Also, as it is widely known and repeatedly underlined by Mel'čuk in all his writings, the mappings are many-to-many, that is one meaning can be mapped into several highly different phonetic representations i.e. texts, and one text can be mapped into several different meanings. It is also true that whenever this feature of the model is illustrated, what is presented is correspondences between a single meaning and several text, in line with the encoding perspective, although they often happen to be talked about in dynamic terms, as in the quote below:

"Nous présentons, dans le cadre de la théorie Sens-Texte, le passage de la structure sémantique (un réseau) d'une phrase à extraction à sa structure syntaxique profonde (un arbre de dépendance)"
.[Kahane, Mel'čuk 1999: 25]

Nevertheless, within the MTM model we are explicitly told [[Mel'čuk 1988: 46] that in contrast to our construed hapless speaker building his or her sentence according to the rules of the Minimalist Program, MTM speakerd know what they are going to say⁹.

⁷ I am quoting from memory. I recall the statement as being made during discussion following the presentation of the paper published as [Bouveret, Fillmore 2008].

⁸ In Mel'čuk terminology the adjective *linguistic*₁ applies to language, in contrast with *linguistic*₂, which applies to linguistics.

⁹ It is important to keep in mind that Mel'čuk's "going to say" is not the same as "wanting to say". The distinction is crucial and will be discussed further on.

Interestingly, another model that in many aspects is thought to resemble the MTM model [Žabokrtský 2005], i.e. the Functional Generative Description although initially encoding oriented, no longer shares this perspective with the MTM and seem to adopt the interpretative approach:

[Functional Generative Description] not only specifies surface structures of the given sentences, but also translates them into their underlying representations. These representations (called tectogrammatical representations, denoted TRs) are intended as an appropriate input for a procedure of semantico-pragmatic interpretation in the sense of intensional semantics, see Hajičová, Partee, and Sgall (1998). Since TRs are, at least in principle, disambiguated, it is possible to understand them as rendering linguistic (literal) meaning (whereas figurative meaning, specification of reference and other aspects belong to individual steps of the interpretation). [Lopatková, Plátek, Sgall 2007: 7-8]

Yet another model of language, i.e. the Functional Discourse Grammar, seems to adopt explicitly the encoding perspective:

FDG [Functional Discourse Grammar] starts with the speaker's intention and then works down to articulation. This is motivated by the assumption that a model of grammar will be more effective the more its organization resembles language processing in the individual. Psycholinguistic studies (e.g. Levelt 1989) clearly show that language production is a top-down process, which start with intentions and ends with the articulation of the actual linguistic expression. [Hengeveld, Mackenzie 2008: 1]

Nevertheless, the Functional Discourse Grammar is, similarly to the MTM model, not a model of actual production of utterances. Further on the authors show that they are perfectly aware of

[...] the dangers of 'hybrid models' oriented partly to pattern and partly to process: our model is a pattern model that is inspired by process without seeking to model the latter.)" [Hengeveld, Mackenzie 2008:24]

The non-production character of the Functional Discourse Grammar is further confirmed in its comparison with the Functional Grammar:

"The predecessor of FDG, Functional Grammar (FG) proclaimed itself to be a quasi-productive model of the natural language user (Dik 1997a: 1) [...] This was to be interpreted as meaning that the various steps in upon the grammar should be understood as having loose parallelism with the temporal sequence of actions conducted by a language user in producing language. Thus the formulation of a communicative intention was seen as being carried out in anticipation of the Addressee interpretation of the linguistic unit. Encoding was then a matter of linguistic choices judged by the Speaker to be likely to have the desired communicative effect upon the Addressee" [Hengeveld, Mackenzie 2008:37]

The three last models (Meaning ↔ Text, Functional Generative Description and Functional Discourse Grammar), besides making explicit the distinction between encoding perspective and decoding perspective, and in the case of MTM and FDG, adopting the encoding perspective, share another important property: they are all stratification models, which means that they assume at least a semantic level of language, and a syntactic level of language, thus postulating a certain degree of independence between semantics and syntax. In such models it is easy enough to see that there is a need for at least some collaboration between semantics and syntax: syntax is used to encode the semantics. In many cases this encoding is straightforward enough and there is enough correspondence between semantic relations and

syntactic ones. However, one still can talk about conflict between semantics and syntax if a language has no means of syntactic encoding of some semantic values or distinctions. An interesting example is provided by differences in adjective syntax in English, Polish and Romance languages. In English the adjective can only appear prenominally¹⁰. In French and Spanish at least some may appear either prenominally or postnominally, with appropriate semantic difference, cf. *église ancienne* ‘church that is old’ vs. *ancienne église* ‘former church’ [Bouchard 2002: 73]. In Spanish the contrast between *el coche nuevo* ‘new car (factory new)’ and *el nuevo coche* ‘new car (recently acquired)’ is taught to learners of Spanish as a foreign language fairly early.¹¹ In Polish there are both cases of obvious differences as in *attaché kulturalny* ‘cultural attaché, i.e. responsible for cultural affairs’ vs. *kulturalny attaché* ‘a cultured attaché (responsible for other affairs) and of less obvious, e.g. *język obcy* ‘a foreign language’ vs. *obcy język* ‘a language unknown to the speaker’.¹² While in English the semantic difference is either encoded lexically, as in the difference between *former* and *old* in the church example, or simply lost as in *an old friend* [Bouchard 2002: 6, 21, 27, 176, 185-6], in Spanish, French and Polish it is shown explicitly in surface syntax. Within the framework proposed in this book one would say that English presents a case of conflict between some semantic distinction, be it what it were, between two ways some characteristics can be attributed to some object, or between two ways adjectives can modify nouns, and a rigid syntax of adjectives. In Polish, French and Spanish, by contrast, the syntax collaborates with semantics, reflecting the difference¹³.

By contrast, it is hardly possible to present a similar conflict within generative framework: if there is a conflict the derivation would simply crash. On the other hand various generative frameworks deals with the *old friend problem* and the position of adjectives, by different accounts, but within these framework the issue does not constitute a conflict.

As can be seen, some conflict-like situation arise when a language has no syntactic pattern to encode some specific bits of meaning. Another conflict is present if a language does not allow for syntactic encoding of some type of information structure. For example, while many languages accept verbs as themes [Huszcza 1991: 52], e.g. in MC or radio announcements of the kind

- (1.2a) Polish: *Śpiewa X*
 Spanish: *Canta X*
 German: *Es singt X*,

English does not, and the appropriate syntactic pattern is nominal:

- (1.2b) *The singer is X*

Other similar examples include the fact that in Dutch the subject pronoun can appear as focus and be thus marked through intonation alone, while in French an appropriate cleft sentence is necessary [Hiligsmann, Rasier 2006: 180], or the fact languages do not possess cleft-

¹⁰ With only a handful of lexically fixed phrases of the type *heir apparent*, *poet laureate* etc.

¹¹ Other semantic distinctions between adjectives used pre- and postnominally in Spanish are not so straightforward as amply shown by Demonte [2008].

¹² There are several proposals how to account for this feature of Polish, most recent include Rutkowski, Progovač [2005; 2006] and Cetnarowska, Pysz, Trugman [2011] and Cetnarowska, Pysz, Trugman [in print].

¹³ At this stage it is immaterial whether we posit some homonymy for the adjectives in question or not.

sentences [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2006] or possess cleft sentences and not pseudocleft sentences [Iatridou Varlakosta 1998].

The absence of conflict can be seen as collaboration, which extends to situations in which a language offers various, more or less syntactic means to encode subtle differences in meaning and/or information structure. Compromise can be seen as using indirect means of encoding some differences, for example by alternate morphology.¹⁴

What follows from what has been said so far is that the idea of conflict, compromise or collaboration between semantics, syntax and information structure can be presented adequately in a framework that follows the encoding perspective, i.e. starts from meaning and shows how this meaning is encoded and presented as surface text. Moreover, it seems that this framework has to be made irreversible and the encoding perspective has to be separated from the decoding one. Some arguments in favor of this position, concerning the information structure has been already presented in [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2008a] and in [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2012] and will be developed further on within the present book. Here suffice it to say that, as exemplified by the *old friend* problem, encoding perspective may lead to information loss. If whatever piece of sense is not encoded in a sentence because of some conflict, it will no longer be represented in the surface sentence and will not be available for decoding. Although it can be argued that in many cases what is called here information loss is actually an ambiguity and the phrase *the old friend* can be always decoded in two ways it may not be the case in more complex situations that will be discussed further on. Moreover, in actual decoding practice the Addressee is not always aware of possible multiple meanings of a given sentence and the question remains what we deem as correct or successful decoding: getting the meaning intended by the speaker or getting all the possible meanings, even those of which the actual speaker may be not aware when producing his or her utterance. This however leads to another issue, i.e. dealing with ambiguity within the speaker's perspective. Usually speakers do not aim for ambiguity and are often unaware of it. Here is where, among other places, the Meaning ⇔ Text Model and the Functional Discourse Grammar part ways: the Meaning ⇔ Text Model starts with what the speakers know they going to say; it is conceivable and even consistent with the fact that the Meaning ⇔ Text Model somehow presents its idealized speaker as knowing how ambiguous the eventual text is going to be. By contrast, Functional Discourse Grammar starts with the speaker's intention which cannot, by any stretch of imagination, contain all the possible ambiguities of the eventual text.

Of the three "Cs", the conflict and the collaboration can be seen in terms of presence or absence of specific linguistic means to encode some element of meaning. However, the third one, i.e. the compromise is not only about available means but about the resolution of the conflict, which comprises some choices being made as to what is being explicitly encoded and what is not. These choices can be seen, at least in part, as belonging to the language itself, which would give rise to some typological statements. For example, I have tried to show that in so called free order languages, like Polish, some highly marked orders, as in deep extraction, are allowed because in Polish the requirements of information structure may overcome, in certain conditions, the requirements of the phrase structure [Linde-Usiekniewicz 2008b].¹⁵ This approach would, however, be conceptually similar to the idea underlying the

¹⁴ As initially presented in Linde-Usiekniewicz [2004], Linde-Usiekniewicz [2006], Linde-Usiekniewicz, Derwojedowa [2004].

¹⁵ This is not the only account for these phenomena that applies the information structure. Something similar, though within the generative framework is done, among others in Fanselow, Ćavar [2003], and Fanselow, Lenertová [2011].

general tenets of the Optimality Theory: It would mean that languages have similar constraints on eventual sentence structure but they vary as to relative strength of these constraints. It would account for different surface syntactic possibilities of languages. However, I am wary of personalizing languages to the degree where choices, including choosing strategies, are presented as left to the languages themselves. The speaker's perspective implies the presence of the speaker behind choices made within the available array of means.